Iowa — Workplace Discrimination

The Iowa Civil Rights Act applies to employers who regularly employ four or more individuals. For purposes of this threshold, individuals who are members of the employer's family are not counted as employees. This 4-employee minimum is lower than the 15-employee threshold under federal Title VII, meaning Iowa's discrimination protections reach some smaller employers not covered by federal law.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(a)

Protected Classes (Effective July 1, 2025)

As amended by Senate File 418 (signed February 28, 2025), the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of age (18 and over), race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, disability (physical or mental), and pregnancy/childbirth/related conditions. "Gender identity"—included as a protected characteristic from 2007 through June 30, 2025—is expressly removed for acts occurring on or after July 1, 2025. The text of Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) for the 2026 Code, as amended, omits gender identity from the list of protected traits.

Pregnancy discrimination remains separately prohibited under Iowa Code § 216.6(2). Employers are covered if they regularly employ four or more individuals (excluding family members), a lower threshold than the 15-employee minimum under federal Title VII.

Municipal Preemption (Effective March 10, 2026)

Senate File 579 (signed March 2026) amended Iowa Code § 216.19 to expressly preempt any city or county ordinance that would create additional protected classes or expand protections beyond those enumerated in the ICRA. As of March 10, 2026, local civil-rights ordinances may not supplement the state list, even if they previously covered categories—such as gender identity—removed from state law. Complaints about acts not covered by the ICRA after these amendments must now be referred to the Iowa Office of Civil Rights for disposition under the narrower state-defined categories.

Summary of currently protected classes (post–July 1, 2025):

• Age (18 and over)
• Race
• Creed
• Color
• Sex
• Sexual orientation
• National origin
• Religion
• Disability (physical or mental)
• Pregnancy, childbirth, or related conditions

Key transition dates:

• July 1, 2025: Gender identity protection ends for new acts.
• March 10, 2026: Municipal expansion of protected classes preempted.

Federal law (Title VII) still prohibits gender identity employment discrimination for employers with 15+ employees, unaffected by the Iowa statutory rollback.

Source: Senate File 418 (Iowa 2025) Source: Iowa Code § 216.6 (2026) Source: Senate File 579 (Iowa 2026)

A person claiming discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act must file a verified written complaint with the Iowa Office of Civil Rights within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice. Iowa Code § 216.15(13) states that a claim under the Act "shall not be maintained unless a complaint is filed with the [agency] within three hundred days after the alleged discriminatory or unfair practice occurred." This administrative filing is a mandatory prerequisite to any subsequent court action under Iowa Code § 216.16.

The 300-day deadline runs from the date of the discriminatory act itself, or in cases of continuing violations constituting a pattern or practice, from the most recent act within the pattern. Iowa Administrative Code § 161-3.2(1) provides that "all alleged continuous violations that constitute a pattern or practice are timely if the most recent act occurred within 300 days of filing the complaint." The filing period is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, which can suspend the running of the deadline. Iowa Admin. Code § 161-3.2(2).

Comparison to federal deadline. Iowa's 300-day requirement aligns with the extended federal EEOC deadline in deferral jurisdictions. Iowa and the EEOC maintain a work-sharing agreement, so filing with one agency and requesting cross-filing with the other is sufficient; dual filing is unnecessary. For employers with 4–14 employees (covered by Iowa but not federal Title VII), the complaint must be filed with the Iowa Office of Civil Rights, as federal law covers only employers with 15 or more employees.

Administrative exhaustion and right to sue. After filing with the agency, a complainant may request an "administrative release" (commonly called a right-to-sue letter) once the complaint has been on file for at least 60 days. Iowa Code § 216.16(2)(b) conditions the right to commence a district court action on the issuance of the release. The statute directs that the agency shall attempt at least a preliminary screen within the first 120 days. Iowa Code § 216.16(7).

Once the release is issued, a lawsuit in Iowa district court must be filed within 90 days of the release date. Iowa Code § 216.16(4) provides that "[a]n action authorized under this section is barred unless commenced within ninety days after issuance by the [agency] of a release under subsection 3." This is a strict statute of limitations; missing the 90-day window bars the claim. If a complainant obtains a release, the agency is barred from further action on that complaint. Iowa Code § 216.16(4).

Effective date of agency renaming. As of July 1, 2024, the Iowa Civil Rights Commission became administratively based within the Iowa Office of Civil Rights. The statutory references to "commission" in Iowa Code Chapter 216 remain unchanged as of the 2025 Code; practitioners should treat the terms interchangeably.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.15 Source: Iowa Code § 216.16 Source: Iowa Admin. Code ch. 161-3 (eff. Jan. 8, 2025)

Prohibited Employment Practices — Iowa Civil Rights Act (as amended July 1, 2025)

Under Iowa Code chapter 216, employers may not discriminate in employment based on certain protected characteristics. However, as of July 1, 2025, gender identity is no longer a protected characteristic under state law.

State-level protections as of July 1, 2025 and after

• As of July 1, 2025, "gender identity" is no longer a protected class under Iowa Code chapter 216. Senate File 418, enacted in 2024, removed gender identity from the list of protected traits effective that date. The Iowa Office of Civil Rights confirms that gender identity is not included among protected characteristics for complaints arising after July 1, 2025 (see authorized guidance below).

• The currently protected characteristics under Iowa Code § 216.6 (2026) for employment—after the July 1, 2025 amendments—are: age (18 and up), race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, religion, disability, and pregnancy.

Grandfathered complaints — discrimination occurring before July 1, 2025

• If the alleged conduct occurred prior to July 1, 2025, a complaint citing gender identity discrimination may still be filed, subject to the 300-day deadline (last practical filing: April 27, 2026). After that window, or for acts arising after July 1, 2025, gender identity is not recognized by Iowa law.

Key employer takeaway

• For conduct after July 1, 2025, gender identity is not a protected class under Iowa state law.
• For complaints about acts before July 1, 2025 (timely filed), gender identity remains actionable for that narrow window.
• Federal law (Title VII) still prohibits gender identity discrimination for employers with 15+ employees, due to Bostock v. Clayton County, but this is a federal—not Iowa—protections overlay (see /guides/united-states/workplace-discrimination).

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6 (2026) Source: Senate File 418 (Iowa 2025) Source: Iowa Office of Civil Rights — Protected Classes FAQ Source: Iowa Code ch. 216, 2025–2026

Iowa’s Civil Rights Act includes a targeted exemption for bona fide religious institutions and their affiliated entities (such as religious schools, associations, corporations, or societies) when it comes to certain employment qualifications. Specifically, Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(d) permits these religious employers to establish qualifications for employment based on either religion or sexual orientation, but only if those qualifications are directly tied to a bona fide religious purpose, as the statute states.

The statute draws a bright-line presumption for specific roles. For instructional personnel or an administrative officer serving in a supervisory capacity within a bona fide religious educational facility or religious institution, a religious qualification is automatically presumed to be a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). This means such institutions may require, for example, teachers or heads of school to adhere to the tenets or practices of their faith, and the law presumes that connection to be central to the job.

For other positions—or for sexual orientation–based requirements—the religious institution must affirmatively show that any such qualification is actually related to a bona fide religious purpose. There is no automatic BFOQ presumption for these roles, so the justification must be specific and religiously grounded if challenged.

Crucially, the exemption does not extend to other protected characteristics under the Iowa Civil Rights Act—such as race, sex (except for the sexual orientation carve-out linked to bona fide religious purpose), national origin, or disability. Discriminatory employment practices based on those classes remain prohibited even for religious employers, unless another exception applies.

In summary:

• Who qualifies? Only bona fide religious institutions and their religiously affiliated schools or organizations.
• What may be required? Employment criteria based on religion (or sexual orientation, if fulfilling a bona fide religious purpose).
• Presumption for certain roles: Automatically applies for religion-based requirements of instructional and senior administrative personnel; otherwise, the religious institution must show the bona fide religious purpose.
• No blanket exception: The exemption is narrow and does not insulate religious employers from the broader prohibitions on discrimination based on non-religious, non-sexual orientation factors.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(d)

A prevailing plaintiff in an employment discrimination case under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) can recover the following remedies, with statutory anchoring and controlling Iowa Supreme Court precedent:

Actual damages and equitable relief: Under Iowa Code § 216.15(8), the Iowa Civil Rights Commission (or an Iowa district court after right-to-sue release) may order "such action as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this chapter," including:

• Reinstatement, hiring, promotion ("employment, or admission to or participation in a program, apprenticeship, on-the-job training, or other occupational training");
• "Payment to the complainant of actual damages, court costs and reasonable attorney fees";
• Orders to cease the unlawful practice, post notice, or provide other equitable relief.

Actual damages routinely include back pay (lost wages and benefits for past harm). Iowa courts have held that front pay (lost future income) may be awarded in lieu of reinstatement when reinstatement is not feasible. (See comparably: Channon v. United Parcel Service, 629 N.W.2d 835, 859–860 (Iowa 2001)).

Liquidated damages for wage discrimination: In wage discrimination cases brought under Iowa Code § 216.6A (the Iowa Equal Pay Law), a plaintiff may recover liquidated damages equal to up to two times the wage differential for the period of violation—or three times that amount if the employer's violation is found to be "willful and wanton" (§ 216.6A(2)(d)-(e)), in addition to court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees.

Attorney’s fees and court costs: Both § 216.15(8) and § 216.6A expressly authorize "reasonable attorney fees and court costs" for prevailing employees.

No punitive damages: Punitive damages are not available under the ICRA. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that unless punitive damages are "expressly authorized by statute," they cannot be awarded in civil rights actions, and the ICRA does not so provide. (Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678, 688–89 (Iowa 2013)).

No general cap on compensatory damages: There is no statutory cap on actual (compensatory) damages or attorney’s fees awarded under the ICRA. The only damages multiplier is specific to wage claims under § 216.6A.

Summary table: | Remedy/relief | Available? | Authority | |---------------------------|------------|-------------------| | Back pay | Yes | § 216.15(8) | | Front pay (in lieu of reinstatement) | Yes | § 216.15(8); Channon (2001) | | Reinstatement/hiring | Yes | § 216.15(8) | | Compensatory (actual + emotional) damages | Yes | § 216.15(8); Ackelson (2013) | | Liquidated (wage cases) | Yes (2x/3x) | § 216.6A(2)(d)-(e) | | Attorney’s fees/costs | Yes | § 216.15(8), § 216.6A(2)(c) | | Punitive damages | No | Ackelson (2013) | | Statutory cap | No (general); Yes (liquidated wage) | § 216.6A(2)(d)-(e) |

Source: Iowa Code § 216.15 Source: Iowa Code § 216.6A Source: Ackelson v. Manley Toy Direct, L.L.C., 832 N.W.2d 678 (Iowa 2013)

The Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA) prohibits employment discrimination based on age, but Iowa law does not impose the same minimum threshold as the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Under the ICRA, protection against age-based employment discrimination begins at age 18. Iowa Code § 216.6(3) provides: "Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to allow discrimination on the basis of age if the person is eighteen years of age or older, except when age is a bona fide occupational qualification." This means that, unlike federal law—which protects only individuals age 40 and older—state law covers all employees who are at least 18 years old with no upper limit. There is no requirement that a claimant be 40 or older, and younger workers are protected as soon as they turn 18 (unless age is a bona fide occupational qualification, which is a narrow, employer-burdened exception and must be clearly justified in context).

Minors under 18 are generally outside the scope of Iowa's age discrimination shield unless a separate law or determination treats them as adults. The Iowa Administrative Code reinforces this approach: "Any person who has reached 18 years of age may not be excluded from any employment right because of an arbitrary age limitation." (Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.15(1)). Iowa law thus provides more expansive age discrimination protection for workers in the 18–39 age cohort than does federal law. There is also no statutory upper age limit—workers of any age above 18 are covered—unless a different legal provision specifies otherwise (none appears in the cited statute or rule as of June 2026).

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(3) Source: Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.15(1)

Even though Iowa removed “gender identity” as a protected characteristic under the Iowa Civil Rights Act effective July 1, 2025, individuals in Iowa remain protected against gender-identity discrimination in employment under federal law when covered by Title VII (employers with 15 or more employees).

Title VII still covers gender identity — Supreme Court authority. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) (decided June 15, 2020), held that employers violate Title VII when they fire or otherwise discriminate against an individual for being transgender or gay. The decision established that discrimination against someone because of their transgender status or sexual orientation inherently involves treating them differently because of sex, which Title VII prohibits. This remains controlling law and is the binding federal standard for all states, including Iowa, regardless of state-level protections.

Recent EEOC guidance developments. The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which enforces Title VII, has consistently interpreted Bostock as extending Title VII protections to transgender status and sexual orientation, and states that these protections apply even if state law provides otherwise. However, the EEOC rescinded its 2024 Enforcement Guidance on Workplace Harassment on January 22, 2026, which had previously elaborated on the application of Title VII to gender identity, including repeated misgendering or restroom access restrictions. The rescission does not affect the underlying protections recognized by Bostock, but practitioners should be aware that this signals a change in the EEOC’s formal published enforcement position, potentially affecting how some specific claims are administratively processed.

Coverage in Iowa remains for employers with 15+ employees. Title VII applies to employers with 15 or more employees (42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)). That federal threshold is unchanged by Iowa’s removal of gender identity from state law. Employees who work for covered Iowa employers may still file complaints under Title VII—either with the EEOC or in federal court—for discrimination based on gender identity.

Effect of state law change. A transgender or non-binary worker in Iowa who experiences gender-identity discrimination by a covered Iowa employer can pursue a Title VII claim, regardless of Iowa law’s coverage. The absence of state protection does not preempt or diminish federal protection.

In sum, Iowa’s removal of gender identity from state civil-rights law does not disturb the federal floor established by Title VII for employers with 15 or more employees. However, the EEOC’s recent withdrawal of guidance may affect the granularity of administrative remedies, but not the baseline protection established by the Supreme Court.

Source: Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. ___ (2020) Source: EEOC, Sex Discrimination – Title VII

Can supervisors and managers be sued individually under Iowa's workplace discrimination law?

Yes — under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA), individual supervisors and managers can be held personally liable for discriminatory employment practices. This is a significant departure from the federal framework, which does not impose individual liability under Title VII.

Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999) — the controlling case

The leading authority is the Iowa Supreme Court's 1999 decision in Vivian v. Madison. The Court held that individuals — including supervisors, managers, or coworkers — may be liable as "persons" who "aid, abet, compel, or coerce" any discriminatory practice forbidden by the ICRA. The statutory anchor is Iowa Code § 216.11(1), which makes it unlawful for "any person to intentionally aid, abet, compel, or coerce another person to engage in any of the practices declared unfair or discriminatory" under the Act.

Standard from Vivian:

• The Court in Vivian interpreted "aid and abet" liability to reach any individual employee — including supervisors and managers — who personally participates in or contributes to a discriminatory act. Active involvement or direct participation is required; mere supervisory status, without involvement in the discrimination, is not enough.
• The Court expressly rejected the argument that only employers (the business entity) are liable. Instead, it found that a supervisor or coworker who is personally involved in the discrimination — or who aids, abets, assists, or directs it — may be sued.

Elements required:

• There must be proof that the individual defendant (supervisor or otherwise) took intentional action to aid, abet, compel, or coerce discriminatory conduct.
• Passive inaction or negligence is not enough; liability attaches only if the individual was an active participant or enabler of the violation.

Post-Vivian — unchanged statutory language: There has been no legislative override or amendment of § 216.11 to limit Vivian. Iowa courts continue to recognize individual supervisory liability under the ICRA based on this standard.

Contrast with federal law: Title VII does not extend liability to individual supervisors, only to the employer entity. The ICRA is thus materially broader in this respect.

Source: Vivian v. Madison, 601 N.W.2d 872 (Iowa 1999) Source: Iowa Code § 216.11(1)

Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e) requires employers to provide unpaid, job-protected leave for employees who are disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, miscarriage, or related medical conditions—up to the period of actual disability or eight weeks, whichever is shorter—if the employer’s own plan does not provide sufficient leave. The statutory design is as a conditional floor: the eight weeks only apply when the employer’s own health/disability or sick leave is inadequate to cover the required absence.

Neither Iowa law nor Iowa administrative guidance expressly states whether the state’s pregnancy-disability leave must run concurrently with leave under the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) for eligible employees. The text of Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e) is silent on this point. However, federal FMLA regulations provide a general framework for interpreting overlaps between state family and medical leave laws and the FMLA. Specifically, 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a) states that an employee is entitled to the greater protection provided by either law, but does not receive double leave unless state law expressly provides additional time off. If a state provision “confers greater family or medical leave rights than the [FMLA], the employer must observe the more beneficial provision; however, leave taken under the [FMLA] may be counted against the employee’s entitlement under the state law.”

In practice, this means that when an employee is eligible for both FMLA and Iowa pregnancy-disability leave, the two leaves are generally designated to run concurrently—allowing the employee the greater protection, but not stacking separate periods of leave absent express statutory language. Employers should: (1) review their own leave policies for adequacy; (2) if those policies do not provide enough time, grant up to eight weeks as required by Iowa law; and (3) for employees also eligible under FMLA, designate the time as FMLA leave and apply it against the 12-week federal entitlement.

Notably, because Iowa law is silent, there is no categorical statutory or administrative statement requiring concurrency, but federal regulatory guidance and mainstream HR practice recognize concurrent designation as the baseline approach unless otherwise required by state law.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e) Source: 29 C.F.R. § 825.701

Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(d) carves out a specific religious exemption from the Iowa Civil Rights Act for “any bona fide religious institution, association, corporation, or society, with respect to any qualifications for employment based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, when such qualifications are related to a bona fide religious purpose.”

Who qualifies as a bona fide religious institution? The statute uses the term “bona fide religious institution” but does not define it further. There is no statutory or regulatory definition within Chapter 216 as of the Code edition in effect. In practice, the ordinary meaning applies—a genuine religious organization or school acting on its religious mission—but the Iowa Code itself does not elaborate.

Covered employment decisions: The exemption allows eligible institutions to establish employment qualifications based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity, but only when those criteria are directly connected to a bona fide religious purpose. The text does not authorize broader discrimination—for example, decisions based solely on race or national origin are not covered by this religious exemption.

Presumed bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ): The statute provides that, for “instructional personnel or an administrative officer, serving in a supervisory capacity” within a bona fide religious educational facility or institution, “a religious qualification shall be presumed to be a bona fide occupational qualification.” For all other employment decisions, the institution must show the qualification is related to a bona fide religious purpose.

Scope limitation: This exemption narrowly permits preference based on religion, sexual orientation, or gender identity in employment only when clearly motivated by bona fide religious reasons and does not provide a sweeping exemption from all discrimination prohibitions under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(6)(d)

Iowa protects individuals from employment discrimination based on age—but that protection begins only once they turn 18, unless they are legally recognized as adults even younger.

Under Iowa Code § 216.6(3), the unfair‑employment‑practice provisions “do not prohibit discrimination on the basis of age if the person subject to the discrimination is under the age of eighteen years, unless that person is considered by law to be an adult.” In plain English: if a person is under 18, Iowa’s workplace‑age‑discrimination law does not apply—unless Iowa law treats that person as an adult (for example, in criminal or emancipation contexts, which are extremely rare in employment law).

Administrative rules reinforce this bright‑line threshold. Iowa Admin. Code 161—8.15(216) states plainly: “Any person who has reached 18 years of age may not be excluded from an employment right because of an arbitrary age limitation and shall be an aggrieved party for the purposes of Iowa Code section 216.15…” That confirms that Iowa law actively protects all individuals aged 18 and over, without exception, from age‑based employment discrimination.

In summary:

• Individuals under 18 are not covered by Iowa’s workplace‑age‑discrimination law—unless they are legally treated as adults.
• Individuals age 18 and over are squarely protected against age‑based employment discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act.

That’s the rule. No federal-style cutoff at age 40 applies here—Iowa’s threshold is chronological (18), not “40+”.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6(3) Source: Iowa Admin. Code 161—8.15(216)

Iowa law explicitly requires employers to provide an unpaid leave of absence for employees disabled by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions, but only when the employee does not have enough leave available through an employer’s standard health, temporary disability insurance, or sick leave plan. This requirement is anchored in Iowa Code § 216.6(2)(e).

Length and conditions of required leave:

• The employer must grant unpaid leave for the "period of disability, or eight weeks, whichever is less." If the actual period of disability (as determined by a medical provider) is less than eight weeks, the employee is only entitled to that shorter period. If the disability lasts longer, the employer’s statutory obligation ends after eight weeks; they may, but are not required to, provide more.
• The leave is required only if sufficient leave under existing employer-provided plans is NOT available. If the employee has available paid or unpaid leave in a sufficient amount under another benefit, the statute does not mandate an additional period.
• The employer may require the employee to provide "timely notice" of the period of leave requested and any changes. The employer may also request certification that the employee is unable to reasonably perform job duties due to medical reasons related to pregnancy or childbirth. The statute does not define "timely notice" or the documentation process in detail, leaving these to general HR practice.

Employer coverage threshold:

• The pregnancy disability leave requirement in § 216.6 applies only to employers who regularly employ four or more individuals. Employees who are immediate family members of the employer are not counted toward this threshold. This is a lower threshold than the federal Title VII floor (15 employees), meaning smaller employers in Iowa can be subject to state obligations even if not covered under federal law.

Summary: In practice, if an Iowa employer (other than a small business with fewer than four regular employees) does not offer sufficient leave through its health/disability/sick leave plans, the employer must grant up to eight weeks of unpaid pregnancy disability leave, subject to timely notice and medical-certification provisions. This is a mandatory statutory floor and cannot be offset by other policies unless those policies already provide sufficient leave for the period of disability.

Source: Iowa Code § 216.6 (PDF)

Iowa law now prohibits cities and counties from enacting or enforcing local civil-rights protections that exceed those enumerated in the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). This preemption was codified by Senate File 579 (SF 579), signed by the governor and effective upon enactment in March 2026.

Legislative preemption — new ceiling for protected classes SF 579 amended Iowa Code § 216.19 to provide: > "A city, county, or other local governmental entity shall not adopt or enforce any ordinance, rule, or other measure that creates a protected class or prohibits discrimination on a basis not included in this chapter, or otherwise expands or creates different categories of unfair or discriminatory practices than those provided in this chapter [ICRA]."

Section 4 of SF 579 states the Act "takes effect upon enactment." The bill was approved March 11, 2026.

Practical effect — invalidation of broader local ordinances Prior to this preemption, several cities (including Iowa City, Des Moines, Ames, and Coralville) had ordinances protecting categories—such as gender identity—that were scheduled to be removed from state law on July 1, 2025. SF 579 expressly prevents local governments from continuing or reinstating such protections from its effective date forward. Any local complaint involving new or broader protected classes must now be deferred to the Iowa Office of Civil Rights, which is limited to those classes enumerated in the ICRA.

Home-rule authority does not override explicit legislative preemption While Iowa Code § 331.301 provides for home-rule, it explicitly conditions this authority on being "not inconsistent with the laws of the general assembly." SF 579 is exactly such law, expressly preempting any local expansion. Thus, local governments cannot maintain or enforce ordinances that extend protections or categories beyond the ICRA.

Summary: As of March 2026, Iowa law makes the ICRA the exclusive list of employment discrimination prohibitions—no broader or different municipal civil-rights coverage is permitted.

Source: SF 579 enrolled text, Iowa General Assembly Source: Iowa Code § 331.301