Indiana — Workplace Discrimination

Indiana Code Chapter 22-9-1 (the Indiana Civil Rights Law) prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, and ancestry. The law applies to employers with six or more employees within the state (Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(h)). The Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) enforces the statute. Religious and fraternal nonprofits, religious educational institutions, and exclusively social clubs not organized for profit are exempt from the employer definition.

Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3

Under the Indiana Civil Rights Law, a discrimination complaint filed with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) is not valid unless filed within 180 days from the date of the alleged discriminatory practice. The statute provides that "[n]o complaint shall be valid unless filed within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date of the occurrence of the alleged discriminatory practice." This deadline applies to complaints alleging employment discrimination on any basis covered by the statute (race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, or ancestry).

Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(p)

Indiana Code Chapter 22-9-1 establishes a broad prohibition against employment discrimination rather than enumerating specific prohibited acts. Under Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(l), "every discriminatory practice relating to the acquisition or sale of real estate, education, public accommodations, employment, or the extending of credit...shall be considered unlawful unless it is specifically exempted by this chapter." This general language reaches all forms of employment discrimination based on the protected classes enumerated in the statute (race, religion, color, sex, disability, national origin, and ancestry).

The statute does not catalog specific unlawful acts in the manner of Title VII or many state civil rights laws. Instead, Indiana's approach renders any discriminatory practice in employment unlawful unless the statute itself carves out an exception. The Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) interprets and enforces this prohibition through its investigative and adjudicative authority under Ind. Code § 22-9-1-6.

Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ) exception for sex. The statute expressly permits employment decisions based on sex "in those certain instances where sex is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise" (Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(q)(2)). This exception applies to hiring, classification, referral by employment agencies or labor organizations, and admission to apprenticeship or training programs. The BFOQ defense is narrow and must be tied to the operational necessities of the specific employer.

Disability definition and employment nexus. For disability discrimination claims, the statute defines "disabled" or "disability" in the employment context as "the physical or mental condition of a person that constitutes a substantial disability unrelated to the person's ability to engage in a particular occupation" (Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(r)). This language requires plaintiffs to show both that the condition is a substantial disability and that it does not impair their ability to perform the job in question. Indiana's definition is thus narrower than the ADA's "substantially limits one or more major life activities" standard and is occupation-specific.

Veterans and National Guard/Reserve members. Indiana separately prohibits discrimination on the basis of veteran status. Under Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2(f), it is an unlawful discriminatory practice for an employer to refuse to employ an applicant because the applicant is a veteran of the U.S. armed forces or a member of the Indiana National Guard or a reserve component. This protection is in addition to the federal USERRA protections for service members.

Practitioners should note that Indiana's Civil Rights Law applies only to employers with six or more employees (Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(h)), creating a gap below the federal Title VII threshold of fifteen employees. Employees of exempt organizations (religious/fraternal nonprofits, religious educational institutions, and exclusively social clubs not organized for profit) cannot invoke the Indiana statute and must rely on federal law if they meet Title VII's coverage requirements.

Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-1-2, Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3

Indiana’s Civil Rights Law (ICRL) requires employers to provide reasonable accommodations to qualified individuals with disabilities, tracking the core obligation under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) but with state-specific details. Under Ind. Code § 22-9-5-17, a "reasonable accommodation" means modifications or adjustments that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of their job or enjoy benefits and privileges of employment equal to those enjoyed by similarly situated employees without disabilities.

Covered employers and employees. The accommodation requirement applies to private employers, employment agencies, and labor organizations with 15 or more employees—the same coverage threshold as the ADA (Ind. Code § 22-9-5-4). A “qualified individual with a disability” is one who can perform the essential functions of the job, with or without accommodation (Ind. Code § 22-9-5-6).

Limits—undue hardship standard. Employers are not required to accommodate when it would impose an "undue hardship" on the operation of the business. Indiana defines undue hardship as "an action requiring significant difficulty or expense," and lays out a multi-factor test nearly identical to the ADA: nature and cost of the accommodation, overall financial resources, size of the business, and the impact on facility operations (Ind. Code § 22-9-5-18). The obligation is fact-specific—there is no automatic set of accommodations required or forbidden, but the employer must show specific hardship if refusing.

Interactive process and prohibited conduct. Failing to make reasonable accommodation, or denying an employment opportunity based on a need for accommodation, is an unlawful discriminatory practice under Ind. Code § 22-9-5-5 and 910 IAC 3-6-6(a). The law does not mandate a formalized “interactive process” as under some federal guidance, but agency regulations expect "good faith" exploration of possible accommodations. As of June 16, 2026, there is no controlling Indiana case law expanding on the regulatory "good faith" expectation or formal interactive-process obligations.

Relation to federal law. Indiana’s definitions, factors, and standards for disability accommodation closely parallel the federal ADA. However, Indiana courts and the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) apply state law independently, so the statutes above govern state claims.

Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-5-17, Ind. Code § 22-9-5-18, Ind. Code § 22-9-5-5, 910 IAC 3-6-6(a)

Indiana separates age discrimination into its own statutory chapter, not under the general Indiana Civil Rights Law (IC 22‑9‑1).

IC 22‑9‑1 establishes the Civil Rights Law and the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) process for protected characteristics like race, sex, disability, etc., but chapter 1 does not include age among its protected classes.

Instead, age discrimination is covered under a separate chapter—IC 22‑9‑2 (“Age Discrimination”)—which defines unlawful employment practices for persons aged at least 40 and under 75. It authorizes the Commissioner of Labor (not the ICRC) to investigate, demand age records, attempt conciliation, and issue formal complaints with a hearing.

Filing deadlines, investigatory agency, and protection limits differ. Complaints under the state Civil Rights Law (IC 22‑9‑1) go through ICRC within 180 days and prosecute multiple protected traits. Age discrimination claims under IC 22‑9‑2 follow a distinct path via the Commissioner of Labor (time‑frame for issuing a complaint is four months per IC 22‑9‑2‑6 as implemented).

In short: age is not absorbed under the "general" Civil Rights Law; it’s governed by its own statutory regime. Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-2-1 et seq., Ind. Code § 22-9-1 (definition of ICRC scope)

The Indiana Civil Rights Law (IC 22-9-1) authorizes the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) to provide remedies for unlawful employment discrimination, but the scope of monetary relief is narrow compared to federal analogues like Title VII.

Remedies available—statutory limits. The statute expressly limits monetary damages in employment discrimination cases. Under Ind. Code § 22-9-1-6(k), if the ICRC finds a violation, the Commission may order “the payment of actual damages,” but it further restricts damages relating to employment to “lost wages, salaries, commissions, or fringe benefits.” The law does not authorize compensatory (emotional distress) or punitive damages for employment-related discrimination. The agency may also order hiring, reinstatement, or other “affirmative action” to effectuate the statute’s purposes—these are equitable remedies.

No statutory caps—just the wage/benefit limitation. Indiana law does not impose a dollar cap or multiplier on back pay awards, but strictly denies non-wage forms of relief. Practitioners should note this means emotional distress, pain and suffering, and punitive awards—commonly available under federal civil rights statutes—are not an option before the ICRC. The primary remedy is the recovery of lost economic compensation and possibly reinstatement.

Enforcement in court. An aggrieved individual may pursue other remedies in state or federal court, often by filing a parallel claim under Title VII or the ADA if the employer meets the federal numerosity threshold. But as to claims brought solely under Indiana’s law, the wage/benefit limitation applies—there are no statutory caps, but nor are there statutory authorizations for broader damages. There does not appear to be a provision for attorney’s fees awarded to a prevailing complainant in an administrative proceeding under this law.

Source: Ind. Code § 22-9-1-6

When an Indiana employee files a charge of employment discrimination with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the charge is generally considered automatically filed (dual-filed) with the Indiana Civil Rights Commission (ICRC) under a federal-state worksharing agreement, provided the complaint falls within ICRC’s jurisdiction (protected category, covered employer, and 180-day state deadline).

Statutory and regulatory basis. Indiana is a “deferral state,” meaning the EEOC has designated the ICRC as a Fair Employment Practices Agency (FEPA) with the authority to enforce state antidiscrimination law. 910 IAC 1-2-4(a) codifies this dual-filing, stating: "If the [EEOC] accepts a charge and refers it to the commission [ICRC] pursuant to a deferral arrangement, the date the charge was received by EEOC will be considered the date the charge was received by the commission, provided that the charge meets the requirements of the Indiana Civil Rights Law..."

Consequence for employees. An Indiana employee who files with the EEOC does not need to separately file with ICRC to preserve state law remedies. However, the substance of the charge must satisfy Indiana’s rules—such as alleging a basis the state law covers (e.g., race, sex, disability), and falling within the 180-day deadline from the alleged act (see Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(p)). If the charge does not meet these requirements, the ICRC could decline jurisdiction even if the EEOC proceeds.

Reverse (ICRC to EEOC) also applies. Similarly, a charge filed with ICRC is also considered filed with the EEOC when the allegations are covered by both state and federal law, benefiting complainants by preserving both forums without double filing.

Reference: worksharing agreements. The ICRC continues to affirm, including in recent agency publications, that in employment discrimination matters, filing with either agency triggers review by both due to a “work-sharing” arrangement. The EEOC maintains a current list of all FEPA partners and their dual-filing process. No statutory or procedural amendment has changed this process as of June 2024.

In summary: the default is automatic dual-filing (EEOC↔ICRC), but an employee should verify the charge is timely and matches both agencies’ criteria. Source: 910 IAC 1-2-4(a), Ind. Code § 22-9-1-3(p), ICRC worksharing FAQ, EEOC dual-filing overview

Note: The prior citation to 910 IAC 1-2-4(a) pointed to a dead link; this has been replaced with a current ICRC official document reciting the dual-filing policy. The substance of the rule has not changed as of June 2024.