Petition standing and domestic industry support thresholds
A petition for an anti-dumping investigation in China must satisfy quantitative standing requirements to confirm that the applicant represents a substantial portion of the domestic industry producing the like product. These thresholds gate MOFCOM's decision to initiate an investigation and mirror the requirements of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
Who may petition. Article 13 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China permits "any domestic industry, natural person, legal person or relevant organization on behalf of the domestic industry" to file a written petition with MOFCOM. The applicant must be a producer or group of producers of the "like product"—the product that is identical to the dumped import or, in its absence, another product that has characteristics closely resembling the dumped import (Article 12). In practice, most petitions are filed by industry associations or coalitions of producers on behalf of the domestic industry.
Domestic industry definition. Article 11 defines "domestic industry" as "the domestic producers as a whole of the like products within the People's Republic of China or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total production of those products," excluding producers who are related to the exporters or importers or who themselves import the dumped product. In exceptional circumstances, producers within a regional domestic market may be regarded as a separate industry if they sell all or almost all of the like products in that market and the demand in that market is not substantially supplied by domestic producers in other regions.
Majority support — the 50% threshold. Article 17 establishes a two-tier standing test. An application is considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry" and MOFCOM may initiate an investigation if the application is supported by domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 percent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. This is the majority-support threshold: the petitioners must represent a majority of those producers who have taken a position (either supporting or opposing the petition).
Minimum participation — the 25% floor. Even if the applicant satisfies the 50% majority-support test, Article 17 establishes a minimum participation threshold: "no investigation shall be initiated when the output of those domestic producers expressly supporting the application accounts for less than 25 percent of the total production of the like domestic product." This floor ensures that a petition represents a meaningful fraction of the entire domestic industry, not just a majority of a small subset that chose to participate in the proceeding.
Application in MOFCOM initiation announcements. MOFCOM's initiation announcements routinely confirm compliance with Articles 11, 13, and 17. In its June 2019 announcement initiating an anti-dumping investigation into imports of 3-cresol from the United States, the EU, and Japan, MOFCOM stated that "the 2016, 2017 and 2018 annual 3-cresol outputs of the Applicant respectively accounted for more than 50% of the 2016, 2017 and 2018 annual 3-cresol outputs of China, which conforms to the provisions of Article 11 and Article 13 of the Anti-dumping Regulations." Similarly, in its July 2015 announcement on acrylic fibers from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, MOFCOM confirmed that "the total output of acrylic fibers of the Petitioners and [supporting producer] ... complies with the provisions of Article 11, Article 13 and Article 17 of the Regulations ... on applying by domestic industry for an anti-dumping investigation."
Self-initiation — ex officio investigations. Article 18 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations permits MOFCOM to initiate an investigation on its own initiative, without a petition, "in special circumstances" if MOFCOM "has sufficient evidence of the existence of dumping, injury, and causal link to justify the initiation of an investigation." Ex officio investigations are rare but have been used in politically sensitive cases.
Verification and rejection of insufficient petitions. MOFCOM conducts a preliminary review of the petition and supporting evidence under Article 16 before deciding whether to initiate. If the petition lacks sufficient evidence or fails the standing thresholds of Article 17, MOFCOM will reject the petition and decline to file the case. In 2012 MOFCOM terminated the anti-dumping investigation into dichloromethane from five countries after the domestic industry submitted a petition for sunset review "without sufficient evidence," leading MOFCOM to decide "not to initiate a final review investigation" and to allow the measures to expire.
Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 11–13, 16–18 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol Originating in the United States, the EU and Japan Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2015 on Case-filing for Anti-dumping Investigation Against Imports of Acrylic Fibers Originated in Japan, South Korea and Turkey Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 48 of 2012 — Termination of Anti-dumping Measures against Dichloromethane
Material injury determination standards and factors
MOFCOM must find that dumped imports have caused material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product as a prerequisite to imposing anti-dumping duties. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China define "material injury" and prescribe the factors MOFCOM must evaluate in its injury analysis, consistent with Articles 3.1–3.5 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.
Definition of injury — three alternative standards. Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations permits anti-dumping measures when an imported product "causes the material injury or the threat of material injury to a related domestic industry already established or materially retards the establishment of a related domestic industry." These are three distinct tests: (1) material injury to an established industry; (2) threat of material injury to an established industry; or (3) material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. Most investigations address material injury, as few industries petition before they are established.
"Objective examination" and "positive evidence" standard. The WTO Antidumping Agreement requires that a determination of material injury "shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination" of the volume of dumped imports, their effect on prices in the domestic market for the like product, and the impact of those imports on domestic producers (Art. 3.1). Chinese law incorporates this standard, and WTO panels reviewing MOFCOM injury determinations have assessed whether MOFCOM's findings rest on positive evidence and objective analysis. In China — HP-SSST (DS454 / DS460), the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 because it "improperly relied on the market share of dumped imports, and its flawed price effects and impact analyses, in determining a causal link between dumped imports and material injury."
Volume of dumped imports. MOFCOM evaluates whether the absolute volume of dumped imports, or the volume relative to production or consumption in China, is significant. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not specify a numeric threshold; significance is assessed in light of market conditions. In MOFCOM's 2025 initiation announcement for analog IC chips from the United States, MOFCOM stated that "from 2022 to 2024, imports of the products under investigation surged by 37% cumulatively, while import prices dropped by 52% cumulatively," supporting the decision to initiate. WTO jurisprudence clarifies that an absolute increase must be assessed in the context of market demand and domestic production; a failure to explain how volume increases contribute to injury (or to distinguish their effect from other causes) may render the determination WTO-inconsistent (China — Cellulose Pulp, DS483).
Price effects — undercutting, depression, and suppression. MOFCOM analyzes whether dumped imports undercut domestic prices, depress domestic prices (cause prices to fall), or suppress domestic prices (prevent price increases that otherwise would have occurred). These are alternative, not cumulative, showings. In several recent announcements, MOFCOM has found that dumped imports "depressed and suppressed domestic product prices," citing parallel declines in import prices and domestic prices and deterioration in domestic industry profit margins. WTO panels have scrutinized MOFCOM's price-effects methodology. In China — Broiler Products (DS427), the panel upheld the United States' claim that MOFCOM's price-undercutting finding was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM compared subject-import and domestic average unit values at different levels of trade and with different product mixes, compromising the accuracy of the comparison. In China — GOES (DS414), the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that MOFCOM failed to disclose all "essential facts" relating to the "low price" of subject imports on which it relied for its price-effects finding, a procedural violation of Article 6.9.
Impact on the domestic industry — the Article 3.4 factors. MOFCOM must evaluate the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry by examining "all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry," including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and capacity utilization; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; and actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and ability to raise capital or investments. These factors mirror WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 3.4. In its 2015 initiation announcement on acrylic fibers from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, MOFCOM stated that the petition claimed dumped imports "reduce and inhibit the price of the same products in the domestic industry, thus leading to the deterioration of production and operation indexes such as before-tax and after-tax profits, ROI, operating rates, inventories, the number of employees and the financing abilities." WTO panels have required that MOFCOM's explanation of impact be grounded in the record and that MOFCOM explain how improving factors (such as output growth driven by market expansion) do not contradict a finding of material injury (China — Cellulose Pulp, DS483).
Causation — non-attribution of injury from other factors. Article 3.5 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement requires that the investigating authority "demonstrate" a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury and "examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry," ensuring that injury caused by other factors "is not attributed to the dumped imports." MOFCOM must separately assess the injurious effects of other known causes—such as non-subject imports from third countries, contraction of demand, changes in consumption patterns, the domestic industry's own expansion decisions, or productivity issues—and must not attribute injury from those causes to the dumped imports. In China — HP-SSST, the Appellate Body held that MOFCOM "failed to ensure that the injury caused by other known factors was not attributed to the dumped imports," a violation of Articles 3.1 and 3.5. Exporters defending against injury allegations routinely submit evidence of alternative causes of injury; MOFCOM's final ruling must address those arguments with reasoning grounded in the record.
Standard of proof — material injury vs. negligible. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not define a quantitative threshold for "material" injury. WTO jurisprudence confirms that "material" means "genuine and substantial" injury, not minor or trivial harm. The regulations do incorporate a negligibility standard from the WTO Agreement: an investigation must be terminated if "the actual or potential volume of the dumped imports or the injury is negligible." For WTO members, the volume of dumped imports is considered negligible if it accounts for less than 3% of total imports of the like product, unless countries that individually account for less than 3% collectively account for more than 7% (WTO Antidumping Agreement Art. 5.8).
Burden on petitioner and respondents. The petitioner bears the initial burden of presenting evidence of injury in the written application. MOFCOM then collects data from domestic producers, foreign exporters, and importers via questionnaires and conducts on-site verifications. Interested parties—both domestic producers and foreign exporters—may submit comments and participate in hearings. If a party "does not truthfully reflect the situation or provide relevant materials, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable period, or otherwise seriously hinders the investigation, the MOFCOM may make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information" (facts available standard, Article 21 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations as referenced in MOFCOM announcements). This may result in adverse inferences, particularly in dumping-margin calculations, but also affects the quality of injury data available to MOFCOM.
Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 2, 21 Source: WTO Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (HP-SSST) from Japan and the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R and WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted 28 October 2015) Source: MOFCOM Announcement on Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigation into Certain Analog IC Chip from the United States, 19 September 2025 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2015 on Case-filing for Anti-dumping Investigation Against Imports of Acrylic Fibers from Japan, South Korea and Turkey
Dumping margin calculation methodology — normal value, export price, and fair comparison
The dumping margin is the amount by which normal value exceeds the export price for the subject merchandise. MOFCOM calculates this margin to determine whether dumping exists, the magnitude of dumping, and the maximum rate of anti-dumping duty that may be imposed. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China prescribe the methodology for establishing normal value and export price and for making a fair comparison between them.
Normal value — the domestic-sale benchmark. Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations defines normal value as "the comparable price actually paid or payable for the like product when it is destined for consumption in the exporting country or region in the ordinary course of trade." This mirrors WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.1. MOFCOM determines normal value using one of three methods, in order of preference: (1) the price of the like product when sold for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country in the ordinary course of trade; (2) if there are no such sales or if the volume of sales in the domestic market is too low to permit a proper comparison, the price of the like product when exported to a third country; or (3) a constructed normal value based on the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and profit. In recent initiation announcements, MOFCOM confirms petitioners' use of the constructed-normal-value method when domestic sales data are unavailable—for example, in Announcement No. 57 of 2016 (POM copolymer from Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia), the applicant "determined the normal value … based on the method of costs plus reasonable expenses and profits" and compared it to the export price to claim a "comparatively large" dumping margin.
Export price — the price to China. Article 7 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that export price is "the price actually paid or payable for the product when it is exported to the People's Republic of China." When the exporter sells directly to an unrelated importer in China, MOFCOM uses the transaction price as the export price. When there is no export price or when it appears that the stated export price is unreliable because the exporter and importer are related or because of a compensatory arrangement, MOFCOM may construct the export price on the basis of the price at which the imported product is first resold to an independent buyer in China, adjusted for costs incurred between importation and resale (such as customs duties, inland freight, and the importer's profit margin). Applicants routinely rely on Chinese Customs import statistics—the dutiable value declared at the border—as the starting point for the export price, then adjust for factors affecting price comparability. In Announcement No. 57 of 2016, the applicant "determined the export price … based on the customs' statistic price of those exported to China, and adjusted factors that would affect the price comparability."
Fair comparison and adjustments. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not enumerate specific adjustment factors, but the WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4—which binds MOFCOM as a member obligation—requires a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value "at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time," with due allowance for differences affecting price comparability. In practice, MOFCOM may make adjustments to normal value or export price (or both) to account for differences in physical characteristics of the product, quantities sold, terms and conditions of sale (such as credit terms, warranties, and technical services), differences in taxation (including VAT treatment if domestic sales bear VAT but export sales are zero-rated), transportation costs, packing costs, and other differences that the parties demonstrate affect price comparability. WTO panels have closely scrutinized MOFCOM's fair-comparison methodology. In China — Broiler Products (DS427), the panel upheld the United States' claim that MOFCOM's price-undercutting finding was inconsistent with WTO Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM compared subject-import and domestic average unit values at different levels of trade and with different product mixes, undermining the accuracy of the comparison. In China — HP-SSST (DS454/DS460), the Appellate Body found that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 when it failed to make necessary adjustments for differences in the products compared, resulting in a distorted dumping margin.
Dumping margin — the comparison result. The dumping margin is the amount by which normal value exceeds export price. MOFCOM typically calculates an individual dumping margin for each foreign exporter or producer that responds to the investigation questionnaire and cooperates with verification. The margin is usually expressed as a percentage of the export price. In its 2019 final ruling on phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan, and Thailand (Announcement No. 37 of 2019), MOFCOM established company-specific dumping margins for cooperating respondents; margins in individual investigations have ranged from low single digits to over 100 percent. The dumping margin established in the final ruling sets the ceiling for the anti-dumping duty rate that may be imposed; under Article 27 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations and WTO Article 9.3, the duty may not exceed the margin of dumping.
Weighted-average and transaction-to-transaction methods. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4.2 permits two standard comparison methodologies: (1) a comparison of the weighted average normal value to the weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions (W-W), or (2) a comparison of normal value and export price on a transaction-by-transaction basis (T-T). The first method is more common in MOFCOM investigations and tends to smooth individual pricing variations. MOFCOM may also use a weighted-average-to-transaction methodology (comparing weighted-average normal value to individual export transactions) when a "pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods" exists and the differences cannot be appropriately accounted for using W-W or T-T comparisons (targeted dumping under Article 2.4.2, second sentence). WTO panels have found that certain applications of zeroing—disregarding comparisons in which export price exceeds normal value—are inconsistent with the fair-comparison requirement; whether and how MOFCOM applies zeroing in margin calculations has been the subject of WTO disputes, and foreign exporters may request disclosure of the calculation methodology under WTO Article 6.9 (disclosure of essential facts).
Facts available when respondents do not cooperate. Article 21 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations authorizes MOFCOM to "make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information" when an interested party "does not truthfully reflect the situation or provide relevant materials, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable period, or otherwise seriously hinders the investigation." This is the facts-available (or best-information-available) standard. In such cases, MOFCOM may rely on the petition, information from other interested parties, or publicly available data (such as price quotes or third-country market data). Facts available often results in a higher dumping margin because MOFCOM may draw adverse inferences from non-cooperation. In Announcement No. 33 of 2019 (3-cresol initiation), MOFCOM confirmed that it would apply Article 21 if a respondent failed to submit timely and complete responses. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Annex II requires that parties be given reasonable opportunity to provide information and that adverse inferences not be used to punish parties for minor or inadvertent failures.
Currency conversion. When normal value and export price are denominated in different currencies, MOFCOM converts both to a common currency using the exchange rate in effect on the date of sale. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4.1 specifies that the "date of sale" is ordinarily the date of contract, invoice, purchase order, or order confirmation, whichever establishes the material terms of the sale. MOFCOM must disregard short-term exchange-rate fluctuations and allow exporters at least sixty days to adjust their export prices to reflect sustained movements in the exchange rate.
Dumping margin in preliminary and final rulings. MOFCOM issues a preliminary dumping-margin determination under Article 24 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations no earlier than sixty days after initiation (to allow respondents time to file questionnaire responses) and typically within six to nine months. The preliminary margins trigger provisional anti-dumping measures in the form of cash deposits or bonds collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC) at the border. MOFCOM issues a final determination under Article 25 within twelve months of initiation (extendable to eighteen months in special circumstances). The final margins are the basis for definitive anti-dumping duties imposed for a term of up to five years. Interested parties may challenge the final dumping-margin determination through administrative reconsideration or by filing suit in a people's court under Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations.
Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 4, 7, 21, 24–25, 27, 53 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 57 of 2016 on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of POM Copolymer from Korea, Thailand and Malaysia Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 37 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of Phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan and Thailand Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol from the United States, EU and Japan Source: WTO Appellate Body Report, China — HP-SSST, WT/DS454/AB/R and WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted 28 October 2015)
Countervailable subsidy definition and benefit calculation methodology
China imposes countervailing duties (also called anti-subsidy measures) on imports that have received a subsidy in the exporting country and that cause material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product. The Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the People's Republic of China (also known as the Countervailing Regulation) govern MOFCOM's investigation of subsidies, the calculation of subsidy rates, and the imposition of countervailing duties. The framework mirrors the substantive and procedural requirements of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).
Statutory trigger — subsidized imports causing material injury. Article 43 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China authorizes the State to impose countervailing measures when "an imported product has directly or indirectly accept[ed] any specific subsidy" from the exporting country and such subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry, or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry. This is a three-part test: (1) existence of a subsidy; (2) the subsidy is specific (targeted to a particular enterprise, industry, or region rather than available economy-wide); and (3) material injury to the domestic industry, with a causal link between the subsidy and the injury.
What is a countervailable subsidy. Under the WTO SCM Agreement Article 1, which binds China as a WTO member, a subsidy exists if there is a financial contribution by a government or public body (or by a private body entrusted or directed by the government to carry out a government function) and a benefit is thereby conferred. The four categories of financial contribution are: (1) a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions); (2) potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees); (3) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., tax credits, tax exemptions, accelerated depreciation); and (4) government provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure, or government purchases of goods. A subsidy is countervailable only if it is specific—limited to an enterprise, industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to a designated geographical region within the exporting country (SCM Agreement Article 2).
MOFCOM investigation of subsidies. MOFCOM investigates whether the imported product received a subsidy from the government of the exporting country, whether the subsidy is specific, and the amount of the subsidy. In countervailing duty investigations, MOFCOM issues questionnaires to the government of the exporting country, to foreign exporters and producers of the subject merchandise, to the domestic industry, and to importers. MOFCOM requests detailed information about government programs alleged to confer subsidies—including the legal basis for the program, the administering agency, eligibility criteria, the form of the financial contribution (grant, loan, tax exemption, equity infusion, provision of goods or services at less than adequate remuneration), the amount of the benefit, and whether the program is limited to specific enterprises, industries, or regions. According to Article 20 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019), "MOFCOM may get information on the related situations from the stakeholders and the governments of the interested countries by conducting questionnaire surveys, sampling, hearing, on-site verification, etc." and carry out the investigation.
Calculating the amount of the subsidy — the benefit standard. The countervailable subsidy rate is the amount of the benefit conferred by the subsidy, expressed as an ad valorem percentage of the product's value. MOFCOM determines the benefit by comparing what the recipient firm actually received or paid under the government program to what the firm would have received or paid in a market transaction without government intervention. For example, if the government provides a loan at a below-market interest rate, the benefit is the difference between the amount the firm actually paid in interest and the amount it would have paid at a commercial interest rate for a comparable loan. If the government provides an input (such as energy, land, or raw materials) at less than adequate remuneration, the benefit is the difference between the price the firm paid and the market price for that input. If the government grants a direct subsidy or a non-repayable grant, the full amount of the grant is the benefit. The WTO SCM Agreement Annex IV sets out guidelines for calculating the benefit for different types of subsidies: equity infusions, loans, loan guarantees, and government provision of goods and services.
Allocation of the subsidy over time. For non-recurring subsidies—such as grants, equity infusions, or debt forgiveness—the benefit must be allocated to the appropriate time period. Under SCM Agreement Article 10 (footnote 31), the benefit is allocated over the average useful life of the assets for which the subsidy was provided. For example, if a company receives a grant for the construction of a production facility with a 20-year useful life, the benefit is spread over 20 years rather than attributed entirely to the year the grant was received. MOFCOM may discount future benefit streams to present value using a commercial discount rate. For recurring subsidies—such as annual tax credits or ongoing provision of inputs at preferential prices—the benefit is calculated year by year during the investigation period.
Company-specific subsidy rates and "all others" rate. MOFCOM calculates an individual subsidy rate for each foreign exporter or producer that responds to the investigation questionnaire and cooperates with verification. The company-specific rate reflects the subsidies received by that company during the investigation period (typically one year). MOFCOM may also establish an "all others" rate applicable to exporters or producers that did not respond or did not receive an individual examination. In its 2013 preliminary ruling on solar-grade polysilicon from the United States (MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013), MOFCOM established company-specific provisional countervailing duty rates for cooperating U.S. producers and imposed provisional measures in the form of cash deposits collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC). The subsidy rates are expressed as ad valorem percentages—for example, a 10% countervailing duty means that an importer must pay a duty equal to 10% of the customs value of the imported product.
Facts available when parties do not cooperate. Article 21 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019) provides that if "a stakeholder or the government of an interested country fails to faithfully reflect the situations or provide necessary information, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable time, or seriously impedes an investigation in any other way, MOFCOM may give a ruling according to available facts and attainable best information." This is the facts-available standard. When the government of the exporting country declines to provide information about an alleged subsidy program, MOFCOM may rely on the petition, publicly available information, or information submitted by other interested parties. Facts available often results in a higher subsidy rate because MOFCOM may draw adverse inferences from non-cooperation. The WTO SCM Agreement Annex II (identical to Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement) requires that parties be given reasonable opportunity to provide information and that adverse inferences not be used to punish minor or inadvertent failures.
Preliminary and final subsidy determinations. MOFCOM issues a preliminary subsidy determination under Article 25 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013). The preliminary ruling addresses three questions: whether subsidies exist, whether the subsidized imports have caused material injury to the domestic industry, and whether there is a causal relationship between the subsidies and the injury. If MOFCOM makes an affirmative preliminary determination on all three questions, it may impose provisional countervailing measures in the form of a cash deposit or bond collected by GACC at the border. The deposit rate equals the preliminary subsidy rate. MOFCOM then issues a final determination. If the final determination is affirmative, MOFCOM recommends the imposition of definitive countervailing duties; the State Council Tariff Commission formally imposes the duties, and GACC collects them for a term of up to five years. The final subsidy rate may differ from the preliminary rate if MOFCOM receives additional information or adjusts its benefit calculations during the final phase of the investigation.
Prohibited and actionable subsidies. The WTO SCM Agreement distinguishes between prohibited subsidies (export subsidies and import-substitution subsidies, which are per se WTO-inconsistent under SCM Agreement Article 3) and actionable subsidies (all other specific subsidies, which may be challenged only if they cause adverse effects to another member's interests). China may impose countervailing duties on imports benefiting from either category, provided the subsidized imports cause material injury to the domestic industry. In practice, most countervailing duty investigations address actionable subsidies—such as government grants, preferential loans, tax incentives, and provision of inputs at less than adequate remuneration—rather than export subsidies, because export subsidies are prohibited by the SCM Agreement and importing countries often bring WTO dispute-settlement cases to challenge them directly.
Specificity determination. A subsidy is countervailable only if it is specific. MOFCOM examines the eligibility criteria and the actual use of the subsidy program. A subsidy is specific if it is explicitly limited by law or regulation to certain enterprises, industries, or regions. A subsidy is also specific in fact if, although the eligibility criteria are neutral on their face, the subsidy is predominantly used by certain enterprises, the administering authority exercises discretion in granting the subsidy in a way that favors certain enterprises, or the subsidy is limited to enterprises in a designated geographical region. General subsidies—such as broadly available tax reductions, infrastructure improvements, or educational programs—are not countervailable. The specificity analysis is particularly important in investigations addressing Chinese subsidies, because many alleged subsidy programs (such as government investment funds, preferential lending by state-owned commercial banks, and provision of land-use rights) involve complex questions about whether the program is limited to specific industries or is available economy-wide.
Review mechanisms. Interested parties may request an interim review of the subsidy rate during the five-year term of the countervailing duty order if they believe the subsidy rate has changed. New exporters that did not export the product during the investigation period may apply for a new-exporter review to obtain an individual subsidy rate. An expiry review (sunset review) may be initiated before the measures lapse; if the review finds that termination of the measures would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury, MOFCOM may recommend extension of the duties for an additional term. Interested parties may challenge the final subsidy determination through administrative reconsideration or by filing suit in a people's court.
Source: Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 43 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013 — Preliminary Ruling of the Countervailing Investigation Against Imports of Solar-Grade Polysilicon Originated in the U.S. Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019 — Filing Anti-subsidy Investigation into Imports of N-Propanol Originating in the United States
Investigation timeline and procedural deadlines — initiation, preliminary ruling, and final determination
MOFCOM anti-dumping investigations follow a sequenced timeline governed by the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China. The regulations establish mandatory deadlines for each stage from petition review through final determination, and interested parties must meet strict response deadlines or risk adverse inferences under the facts-available standard.
Petition review and initiation — the sixty-day decision window. Article 16 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations requires MOFCOM to "decide whether or not to initiate an investigation" within sixty days of receiving a petition. MOFCOM conducts a preliminary review of the petition to verify that the applicant represents the domestic industry (Articles 11, 13, and 17 standing thresholds) and that the petition contains sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causation under Articles 14 and 15. If the petition satisfies these requirements, MOFCOM issues an initiation announcement; if not, MOFCOM rejects the petition and declines to file the case. The sixty-day clock runs from the date MOFCOM formally receives the petition, not from the date a draft or incomplete submission arrives. MOFCOM initiation announcements confirm the date of receipt and the date of the initiation decision—for example, in Announcement No. 33 of 2019 (3-cresol from the United States, EU, and Japan), MOFCOM stated it "received, on June 20, 2019, an application" and decided to initiate the investigation effective July 23, 2019, thirty-three days later.
Registration of interested parties — twenty days after initiation. MOFCOM initiation announcements uniformly state that "any stakeholder may register with the Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce for this anti-dumping investigation within 20 days after the issue date of the Announcement." Article 19 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations defines interested parties to include foreign exporters and producers, importers, the government of the exporting country, domestic producers of the like product, and trade or business associations a majority of whose members produce, export, or import the product under investigation. Parties that fail to register within the twenty-day window may still submit information or participate in hearings, but MOFCOM typically limits questionnaire distribution to registered parties and may decline to conduct on-site verifications for late registrants.
Questionnaire issuance and response deadlines. MOFCOM "usually issues questionnaires to the foreign exporters or manufacturers, domestic manufacturers and domestic importers involved in the case within 10 working days from the deadline for registering for the investigation" (Announcement No. 33 of 2019). Article 20 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations authorizes MOFCOM to "get information on the related situations from the stakeholders by conducting questionnaire surveys, sampling, hearing, on-site verification, etc." The questionnaires request detailed data on corporate structure, production costs, domestic sales, export sales to China, related-party transactions, and the like product. MOFCOM specifies response deadlines in the questionnaire cover letter; typical deadlines range from thirty to forty-five days from the date of issuance. Extensions may be granted for good cause, but interested parties must request extensions in writing before the original deadline expires. Parties that fail to submit timely and complete responses, or that "otherwise seriously hinder[] the investigation," face application of the facts-available standard under Article 21, which permits MOFCOM to "make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information"—often resulting in higher dumping margins derived from adverse inferences or petition data.
On-site verification. "When necessary, the MOFCOM will assign workers to conduct on-site inspections at relevant countries" to verify questionnaire data submitted by foreign exporters and producers (Announcement No. 52 of 2019). Article 20 permits MOFCOM to conduct on-site verification "when it deems necessary." MOFCOM must inform the relevant government and the enterprise in advance, and the enterprise must submit a statement agreeing to the verification. On-site verifications typically occur four to seven months after initiation, following questionnaire submission and preliminary review of the responses. MOFCOM verification teams examine source documents (invoices, contracts, accounting records, production reports) and interview company officials to confirm the accuracy and completeness of reported data. Refusal to permit verification, or failure to provide requested documents during verification, may trigger the facts-available standard.
Preliminary determination — no earlier than sixty days after initiation. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 7.3 prohibits imposition of provisional measures "sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation," and Chinese practice adheres to this floor. MOFCOM typically issues a preliminary ruling under Article 24 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations within six to nine months of initiation. The preliminary ruling announces preliminary findings on dumping, dumping margins, injury, and causation and may impose provisional anti-dumping measures in the form of cash deposits or bonds collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC) at the border. In the phenol investigation (United States, EU, Korea, Japan, Thailand), MOFCOM initiated on March 26, 2018, and issued the preliminary ruling on May 27, 2019—fourteen months later (Announcement No. 37 of 2019). The preliminary ruling triggers a comment period; interested parties may submit written comments on the preliminary findings, typically within ten to twenty days of the announcement.
Duration of provisional measures — four to nine months. Under the older (pre-2004) Anti-Dumping Regulations filed with the WTO, "the period for the interim anti-dumping duty shall be four months from the date of announcement of the decision of interim anti-dumping measures; and it may be extended to nine months under the special circumstances" (Article 24 of the 1997 Regulations). Current MOFCOM practice continues to apply a four-to-nine-month term for provisional measures. Provisional measures remain in effect until MOFCOM issues the final determination, at which point they are either superseded by definitive anti-dumping duties (with retroactive collection if the final margin exceeds the provisional rate) or terminated if MOFCOM makes a negative final determination.
Final determination — twelve months, extendable to eighteen months. Article 28 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that an anti-dumping investigation "shall be concluded within twelve months from the date of the decision to file the case," and "under special circumstances, it may be prolonged, but the longest extension shall not exceed six months," yielding an eighteen-month outer limit. This timeline mirrors WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 5.10, which requires that "investigations shall … be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation." In practice, MOFCOM completes the majority of original investigations within twelve months. In the Australian wine investigation initiated August 18, 2020, MOFCOM stated that "usually, the investigation will be completed before August 18, 2021, while under certain conditions the investigation period could be extended to February 18, 2022" (twelve plus six months). MOFCOM issues the final determination under Article 25 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The final ruling announces definitive findings on dumping, injury, and causation and, if affirmative, sets company-specific dumping margins that serve as the ceiling for the anti-dumping duty rates. In the stainless steel investigation (EU, Japan, Korea, Indonesia), MOFCOM initiated on July 23, 2018, issued the preliminary ruling on March 22, 2019 (eight months), and issued the final ruling on July 23, 2019 (exactly twelve months from initiation) (Announcement No. 31 of 2019).
Imposition of definitive duties. Following an affirmative final determination, MOFCOM recommends imposition of anti-dumping duties to the State Council Tariff Commission under Article 38 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The Tariff Commission decides whether to impose duties and at what rates (up to the dumping margin ceiling). Definitive duties are imposed for a term of up to five years under the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The General Administration of Customs (GACC) collects the duties at the border as imports enter China. Interested parties may challenge the final determination through administrative reconsideration or by initiating litigation in a people's court under Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations.
Review investigations — interim reviews, new exporter reviews, and sunset reviews. Article 49 permits interested parties to request an interim review of the dumping margin during the five-year term of an anti-dumping duty order if circumstances warrant a recalculation. Article 47 permits exporters that did not export the product during the original investigation period to apply for a new exporter review to establish an individual dumping margin. Article 48 governs expiry reviews (sunset reviews): before the five-year term expires, the domestic industry may petition MOFCOM to extend the measures by demonstrating that termination would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. MOFCOM must initiate the expiry review and issue a determination; if the review finds likelihood of continuation or recurrence, the measures may be extended for an additional term (typically another five years). The timeline for expiry reviews is not specified in the regulations, but MOFCOM practice typically completes expiry reviews within twelve to eighteen months of initiation, mirroring the timeline for original investigations.
Termination for insufficient evidence or withdrawal of petition. MOFCOM may terminate an investigation at any stage if it determines that the evidence of dumping or injury is insufficient or if the petitioner withdraws the application. In 2012, MOFCOM terminated the anti-dumping investigation into dichloromethane from five countries after the domestic industry submitted a petition for sunset review "without sufficient evidence," leading MOFCOM to decide "not to initiate a final review investigation" and to allow the measures to expire (Announcement No. 48 of 2012). Similarly, Article 27 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that MOFCOM "shall immediately terminate the anti-dumping investigation" if the petitioner withdraws its application.
Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 16, 20–21, 24–25, 27–28, 38, 47–49, 53 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol from the United States, the EU and Japan Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 37 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of Phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan and Thailand Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 31 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Stainless Steel Billets and Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Plates/Coils from the EU, Japan, Korea, Indonesia Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019 — Review of the Anti-dumping Measures Applicable to Imports of Halogenated Butyl Rubber Source: MOFCOM initiates an anti-dumping investigation on certain imported wines from Australia, August 18, 2020 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 48 of 2012 — Termination of Anti-dumping Measures against Dichloromethane