China — Trade Remedies

China’s trade-remedy statutory framework was substantively updated effective March 1, 2026, with amendments to the Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, and further broadened with the promulgation of the Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (State Council Order No. 835, effective April 7, 2026). These changes materially expand the scope and authority base for China’s trade remedies regime, adding explicit references to national sovereignty and countermeasures, and introducing new regulatory instruments to address foreign extraterritorial measures.

Revised Foreign Trade Law (2026 revision). The Foreign Trade Law (as revised December 27, 2025; effective March 1, 2026) remains the fundamental statute governing China’s authority to initiate and apply anti-dumping, countervailing (anti-subsidy), safeguard, and anti-circumvention measures. The 2026 amendments: (1) reinforce the law's objective to safeguard China’s sovereignty, security, and development interests in all foreign trade activities (Articles 1 and 3, as amended); (2) expand the grounds on which China, through the State Council and its authorized agencies, may adopt restrictive or remedial measures, including new types of investigations and countermeasures as deemed appropriate for “unreasonable restrictions” or “actions undermining China’s rights” under international or bilateral trade agreements (Articles 7, 16, and 68, as amended); and (3) clarify coordination between MOFCOM, the State Council Tariff Commission, and other relevant agencies for both domestic injury investigations and execution of countermeasures.

Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (2026). The Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction by Foreign States (State Council Order No. 835, effective April 7, 2026) introduce a new implementing instrument. These regulations empower the Ministry of Justice—working through a new interagency mechanism under the State Council—to (a) identify foreign legal provisions or actions as constituting “improper extraterritorial jurisdiction”; (b) issue blocking orders or directives prohibiting Chinese entities from complying with such measures; (c) recommend countermeasures to the State Council, including restrictions on trade, investment, or other commercial relations; and (d) designate foreign entities or individuals for sanction under a formal “Malicious Entity List.” Trade remedy practice is now expressly linked to this mechanism, with MOFCOM’s investigative and remedial authority supplemented by the State Council’s and Ministry of Justice’s new powers under these regulations.

Administering authorities and coordination. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) remains the sole investigating authority for anti-dumping, countervailing, safeguard, and anti-circumvention proceedings on imports injuring domestic industries, coordinating with General Administration of Customs (GACC) and the State Council Tariff Commission for the collection and imposition of duties. The Ministry of Justice exercises power under the new regulations to counter foreign extraterritorial jurisdiction, working closely with MOFCOM where trade remedies potentially intersect with blocking or countermeasures.

Effective date of changes. The current statutory and regulatory framework reflects the Foreign Trade Law as revised and effective from March 1, 2026, and the Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Regulations effective April 7, 2026. Prior practice and authority are superseded to the extent of inconsistency.

Source: Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China (2026 revision), effective March 1, 2026 Source: Regulations on Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, State Council Order No. 835, effective April 7, 2026 Source: MOFCOM Announcement on Implementation of New Foreign Trade Law and Countering Improper Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Regulations (April 2026)

A petition for an anti-dumping investigation in China must satisfy quantitative standing requirements to confirm that the applicant represents a substantial portion of the domestic industry producing the like product. These thresholds gate MOFCOM's decision to initiate an investigation and mirror the requirements of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.

Who may petition. Article 13 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China permits "any domestic industry, natural person, legal person or relevant organization on behalf of the domestic industry" to file a written petition with MOFCOM. The applicant must be a producer or group of producers of the "like product"—the product that is identical to the dumped import or, in its absence, another product that has characteristics closely resembling the dumped import (Article 12). In practice, most petitions are filed by industry associations or coalitions of producers on behalf of the domestic industry.

Domestic industry definition. Article 11 defines "domestic industry" as "the domestic producers as a whole of the like products within the People's Republic of China or those of them whose collective output of the products constitutes a major proportion of the total production of those products," excluding producers who are related to the exporters or importers or who themselves import the dumped product. In exceptional circumstances, producers within a regional domestic market may be regarded as a separate industry if they sell all or almost all of the like products in that market and the demand in that market is not substantially supplied by domestic producers in other regions.

Majority support — the 50% threshold. Article 17 establishes a two-tier standing test. An application is considered to have been made "by or on behalf of the domestic industry" and MOFCOM may initiate an investigation if the application is supported by domestic producers whose collective output constitutes more than 50 percent of the total production of the like product produced by that portion of the domestic industry expressing either support for or opposition to the application. This is the majority-support threshold: the petitioners must represent a majority of those producers who have taken a position (either supporting or opposing the petition).

Minimum participation — the 25% floor. Even if the applicant satisfies the 50% majority-support test, Article 17 establishes a minimum participation threshold: "no investigation shall be initiated when the output of those domestic producers expressly supporting the application accounts for less than 25 percent of the total production of the like domestic product." This floor ensures that a petition represents a meaningful fraction of the entire domestic industry, not just a majority of a small subset that chose to participate in the proceeding.

Application in MOFCOM initiation announcements. MOFCOM's initiation announcements routinely confirm compliance with Articles 11, 13, and 17. In its June 2019 announcement initiating an anti-dumping investigation into imports of 3-cresol from the United States, the EU, and Japan, MOFCOM stated that "the 2016, 2017 and 2018 annual 3-cresol outputs of the Applicant respectively accounted for more than 50% of the 2016, 2017 and 2018 annual 3-cresol outputs of China, which conforms to the provisions of Article 11 and Article 13 of the Anti-dumping Regulations." Similarly, in its July 2015 announcement on acrylic fibers from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, MOFCOM confirmed that "the total output of acrylic fibers of the Petitioners and [supporting producer] ... complies with the provisions of Article 11, Article 13 and Article 17 of the Regulations ... on applying by domestic industry for an anti-dumping investigation."

Self-initiation — ex officio investigations. Article 18 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations permits MOFCOM to initiate an investigation on its own initiative, without a petition, "in special circumstances" if MOFCOM "has sufficient evidence of the existence of dumping, injury, and causal link to justify the initiation of an investigation." Ex officio investigations are rare but have been used in politically sensitive cases.

Verification and rejection of insufficient petitions. MOFCOM conducts a preliminary review of the petition and supporting evidence under Article 16 before deciding whether to initiate. If the petition lacks sufficient evidence or fails the standing thresholds of Article 17, MOFCOM will reject the petition and decline to file the case. In 2012 MOFCOM terminated the anti-dumping investigation into dichloromethane from five countries after the domestic industry submitted a petition for sunset review "without sufficient evidence," leading MOFCOM to decide "not to initiate a final review investigation" and to allow the measures to expire.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 11–13, 16–18 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol Originating in the United States, the EU and Japan Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2015 on Case-filing for Anti-dumping Investigation Against Imports of Acrylic Fibers Originated in Japan, South Korea and Turkey Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 48 of 2012 — Termination of Anti-dumping Measures against Dichloromethane

MOFCOM must find that dumped imports have caused material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product as a prerequisite to imposing anti-dumping duties. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China define "material injury" and prescribe the factors MOFCOM must evaluate in its injury analysis, consistent with Articles 3.1–3.5 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement.

Definition of injury — three alternative standards. Article 2 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations permits anti-dumping measures when an imported product "causes the material injury or the threat of material injury to a related domestic industry already established or materially retards the establishment of a related domestic industry." These are three distinct tests: (1) material injury to an established industry; (2) threat of material injury to an established industry; or (3) material retardation of the establishment of a domestic industry. Most investigations address material injury, as few industries petition before they are established.

"Objective examination" and "positive evidence" standard. The WTO Antidumping Agreement requires that a determination of material injury "shall be based on positive evidence and involve an objective examination" of the volume of dumped imports, their effect on prices in the domestic market for the like product, and the impact of those imports on domestic producers (Art. 3.1). Chinese law incorporates this standard, and WTO panels reviewing MOFCOM injury determinations have assessed whether MOFCOM's findings rest on positive evidence and objective analysis. In China — HP-SSST (DS454 / DS460), the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Articles 3.1 and 3.5 because it "improperly relied on the market share of dumped imports, and its flawed price effects and impact analyses, in determining a causal link between dumped imports and material injury."

Volume of dumped imports. MOFCOM evaluates whether the absolute volume of dumped imports, or the volume relative to production or consumption in China, is significant. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not specify a numeric threshold; significance is assessed in light of market conditions. In MOFCOM's 2025 initiation announcement for analog IC chips from the United States, MOFCOM stated that "from 2022 to 2024, imports of the products under investigation surged by 37% cumulatively, while import prices dropped by 52% cumulatively," supporting the decision to initiate. WTO jurisprudence clarifies that an absolute increase must be assessed in the context of market demand and domestic production; a failure to explain how volume increases contribute to injury (or to distinguish their effect from other causes) may render the determination WTO-inconsistent (China — Cellulose Pulp, DS483).

Price effects — undercutting, depression, and suppression. MOFCOM analyzes whether dumped imports undercut domestic prices, depress domestic prices (cause prices to fall), or suppress domestic prices (prevent price increases that otherwise would have occurred). These are alternative, not cumulative, showings. In several recent announcements, MOFCOM has found that dumped imports "depressed and suppressed domestic product prices," citing parallel declines in import prices and domestic prices and deterioration in domestic industry profit margins. WTO panels have scrutinized MOFCOM's price-effects methodology. In China — Broiler Products (DS427), the panel upheld the United States' claim that MOFCOM's price-undercutting finding was inconsistent with Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM compared subject-import and domestic average unit values at different levels of trade and with different product mixes, compromising the accuracy of the comparison. In China — GOES (DS414), the Appellate Body upheld the panel's finding that MOFCOM failed to disclose all "essential facts" relating to the "low price" of subject imports on which it relied for its price-effects finding, a procedural violation of Article 6.9.

Impact on the domestic industry — the Article 3.4 factors. MOFCOM must evaluate the impact of dumped imports on the domestic industry by examining "all relevant economic factors and indices having a bearing on the state of the industry," including actual and potential decline in output, sales, market share, profits, productivity, return on investments, and capacity utilization; factors affecting domestic prices; the magnitude of the margin of dumping; and actual and potential negative effects on cash flow, inventories, employment, wages, growth, and ability to raise capital or investments. These factors mirror WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 3.4. In its 2015 initiation announcement on acrylic fibers from Japan, South Korea, and Turkey, MOFCOM stated that the petition claimed dumped imports "reduce and inhibit the price of the same products in the domestic industry, thus leading to the deterioration of production and operation indexes such as before-tax and after-tax profits, ROI, operating rates, inventories, the number of employees and the financing abilities." WTO panels have required that MOFCOM's explanation of impact be grounded in the record and that MOFCOM explain how improving factors (such as output growth driven by market expansion) do not contradict a finding of material injury (China — Cellulose Pulp, DS483).

Causation — non-attribution of injury from other factors. Article 3.5 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement requires that the investigating authority "demonstrate" a causal relationship between the dumped imports and the injury and "examine any known factors other than the dumped imports which at the same time are injuring the domestic industry," ensuring that injury caused by other factors "is not attributed to the dumped imports." MOFCOM must separately assess the injurious effects of other known causes—such as non-subject imports from third countries, contraction of demand, changes in consumption patterns, the domestic industry's own expansion decisions, or productivity issues—and must not attribute injury from those causes to the dumped imports. In China — HP-SSST, the Appellate Body held that MOFCOM "failed to ensure that the injury caused by other known factors was not attributed to the dumped imports," a violation of Articles 3.1 and 3.5. Exporters defending against injury allegations routinely submit evidence of alternative causes of injury; MOFCOM's final ruling must address those arguments with reasoning grounded in the record.

Standard of proof — material injury vs. negligible. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not define a quantitative threshold for "material" injury. WTO jurisprudence confirms that "material" means "genuine and substantial" injury, not minor or trivial harm. The regulations do incorporate a negligibility standard from the WTO Agreement: an investigation must be terminated if "the actual or potential volume of the dumped imports or the injury is negligible." For WTO members, the volume of dumped imports is considered negligible if it accounts for less than 3% of total imports of the like product, unless countries that individually account for less than 3% collectively account for more than 7% (WTO Antidumping Agreement Art. 5.8).

Burden on petitioner and respondents. The petitioner bears the initial burden of presenting evidence of injury in the written application. MOFCOM then collects data from domestic producers, foreign exporters, and importers via questionnaires and conducts on-site verifications. Interested parties—both domestic producers and foreign exporters—may submit comments and participate in hearings. If a party "does not truthfully reflect the situation or provide relevant materials, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable period, or otherwise seriously hinders the investigation, the MOFCOM may make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information" (facts available standard, Article 21 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations as referenced in MOFCOM announcements). This may result in adverse inferences, particularly in dumping-margin calculations, but also affects the quality of injury data available to MOFCOM.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 2, 21 Source: WTO Appellate Body Report, China — Measures Imposing Anti-Dumping Duties on High-Performance Stainless Steel Seamless Tubes (HP-SSST) from Japan and the European Union, WT/DS454/AB/R and WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted 28 October 2015) Source: MOFCOM Announcement on Initiation of Anti-Dumping Investigation into Certain Analog IC Chip from the United States, 19 September 2025 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 of 2015 on Case-filing for Anti-dumping Investigation Against Imports of Acrylic Fibers from Japan, South Korea and Turkey

The dumping margin is the amount by which normal value exceeds the export price for the subject merchandise. MOFCOM calculates this margin to determine whether dumping exists, the magnitude of dumping, and the maximum rate of anti-dumping duty that may be imposed. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China prescribe the methodology for establishing normal value and export price and for making a fair comparison between them.

Normal value — the domestic-sale benchmark. Article 4 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations defines normal value as "the comparable price actually paid or payable for the like product when it is destined for consumption in the exporting country or region in the ordinary course of trade." This mirrors WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.1. MOFCOM determines normal value using one of three methods, in order of preference: (1) the price of the like product when sold for consumption in the domestic market of the exporting country in the ordinary course of trade; (2) if there are no such sales or if the volume of sales in the domestic market is too low to permit a proper comparison, the price of the like product when exported to a third country; or (3) a constructed normal value based on the cost of production in the country of origin plus a reasonable amount for selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses and profit. In recent initiation announcements, MOFCOM confirms petitioners' use of the constructed-normal-value method when domestic sales data are unavailable—for example, in Announcement No. 57 of 2016 (POM copolymer from Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia), the applicant "determined the normal value … based on the method of costs plus reasonable expenses and profits" and compared it to the export price to claim a "comparatively large" dumping margin. (Official summary page is now only available in Chinese; English full text is not available on a government domain.)

Export price — the price to China. Article 7 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that export price is "the price actually paid or payable for the product when it is exported to the People's Republic of China." When the exporter sells directly to an unrelated importer in China, MOFCOM uses the transaction price as the export price. When there is no export price or when it appears that the stated export price is unreliable because the exporter and importer are related or because of a compensatory arrangement, MOFCOM may construct the export price on the basis of the price at which the imported product is first resold to an independent buyer in China, adjusted for costs incurred between importation and resale (such as customs duties, inland freight, and the importer's profit margin). Applicants routinely rely on Chinese Customs import statistics—the dutiable value declared at the border—as the starting point for the export price, then adjust for factors affecting price comparability. In Announcement No. 57 of 2016, the applicant "determined the export price … based on the customs' statistic price of those exported to China, and adjusted factors that would affect the price comparability."

Fair comparison and adjustments. The Anti-Dumping Regulations do not enumerate specific adjustment factors, but the WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4—which binds MOFCOM as a member obligation—requires a "fair comparison" between export price and normal value "at the same level of trade, normally at the ex-factory level, and in respect of sales made at as nearly as possible the same time," with due allowance for differences affecting price comparability. In practice, MOFCOM may make adjustments to normal value or export price (or both) to account for differences in physical characteristics of the product, quantities sold, terms and conditions of sale (such as credit terms, warranties, and technical services), differences in taxation (including VAT treatment if domestic sales bear VAT but export sales are zero-rated), transportation costs, packing costs, and other differences that the parties demonstrate affect price comparability. WTO panels have closely scrutinized MOFCOM's fair-comparison methodology. In China — Broiler Products (DS427), the panel upheld the United States' claim that MOFCOM's price-undercutting finding was inconsistent with WTO Articles 3.1 and 3.2 because MOFCOM compared subject-import and domestic average unit values at different levels of trade and with different product mixes, undermining the accuracy of the comparison. In China — HP-SSST (DS454/DS460), the Appellate Body found that MOFCOM acted inconsistently with Article 2.4 when it failed to make necessary adjustments for differences in the products compared, resulting in a distorted dumping margin.

Dumping margin — the comparison result. The dumping margin is the amount by which normal value exceeds export price. MOFCOM typically calculates an individual dumping margin for each foreign exporter or producer that responds to the investigation questionnaire and cooperates with verification. The margin is usually expressed as a percentage of the export price. In its 2019 final ruling on phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan, and Thailand (Announcement No. 37 of 2019), MOFCOM established company-specific dumping margins for cooperating respondents; margins in individual investigations have ranged from low single digits to over 100 percent. The dumping margin established in the final ruling sets the ceiling for the anti-dumping duty rate that may be imposed; under Article 27 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations and WTO Article 9.3, the duty may not exceed the margin of dumping.

Weighted-average and transaction-to-transaction methods. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4.2 permits two standard comparison methodologies: (1) a comparison of the weighted average normal value to the weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions (W-W), or (2) a comparison of normal value and export price on a transaction-by-transaction basis (T-T). The first method is more common in MOFCOM investigations and tends to smooth individual pricing variations. MOFCOM may also use a weighted-average-to-transaction methodology (comparing weighted-average normal value to individual export transactions) when a "pattern of export prices which differ significantly among different purchasers, regions or time periods" exists and the differences cannot be appropriately accounted for using W-W or T-T comparisons (targeted dumping under Article 2.4.2, second sentence). WTO panels have found that certain applications of zeroing—disregarding comparisons in which export price exceeds normal value—are inconsistent with the fair-comparison requirement; whether and how MOFCOM applies zeroing in margin calculations has been the subject of WTO disputes, and foreign exporters may request disclosure of the calculation methodology under WTO Article 6.9 (disclosure of essential facts).

Facts available when respondents do not cooperate. Article 21 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations authorizes MOFCOM to "make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information" when an interested party "does not truthfully reflect the situation or provide relevant materials, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable period, or otherwise seriously hinders the investigation." This is the facts-available (or best-information-available) standard. In such cases, MOFCOM may rely on the petition, information from other interested parties, or publicly available data (such as price quotes or third-country market data). Facts available often results in a higher dumping margin because MOFCOM may draw adverse inferences from non-cooperation. In Announcement No. 33 of 2019 (3-cresol initiation), MOFCOM confirmed that it would apply Article 21 if a respondent failed to submit timely and complete responses. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Annex II requires that parties be given reasonable opportunity to provide information and that adverse inferences not be used to punish parties for minor or inadvertent failures.

Currency conversion. When normal value and export price are denominated in different currencies, MOFCOM converts both to a common currency using the exchange rate in effect on the date of sale. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 2.4.1 specifies that the "date of sale" is ordinarily the date of contract, invoice, purchase order, or order confirmation, whichever establishes the material terms of the sale. MOFCOM must disregard short-term exchange-rate fluctuations and allow exporters at least sixty days to adjust their export prices to reflect sustained movements in the exchange rate.

Dumping margin in preliminary and final rulings. MOFCOM issues a preliminary dumping-margin determination under Article 24 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations no earlier than sixty days after initiation (to allow respondents time to file questionnaire responses) and typically within six to nine months. The preliminary margins trigger provisional anti-dumping measures in the form of cash deposits or bonds collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC) at the border. MOFCOM issues a final determination under Article 25 within twelve months of initiation (extendable to eighteen months in special circumstances). The final margins are the basis for definitive anti-dumping duties imposed for a term of up to five years. Interested parties may challenge the final dumping-margin determination through administrative reconsideration or by filing suit in a people's court under Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 4, 7, 21, 24–25, 27, 53 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 57 of 2016 on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of POM Copolymer from Korea, Thailand and Malaysia — summary (Chinese) Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 37 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of Phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan and Thailand Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol from the United States, EU and Japan Source: WTO Appellate Body Report, China — HP-SSST, WT/DS454/AB/R and WT/DS460/AB/R (adopted 28 October 2015)

The official English full text of MOFCOM Announcement No. 57 of 2016 is not available as of this update; a Chinese-language government summary is now linked. All other legal methodology remains current as of this review (2024-06-11).

China imposes countervailing duties (also called anti-subsidy measures) on imports that have received a subsidy in the exporting country and that cause material injury to the domestic industry producing the like product. The Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the People's Republic of China (also known as the Countervailing Regulation) govern MOFCOM's investigation of subsidies, the calculation of subsidy rates, and the imposition of countervailing duties. The framework mirrors the substantive and procedural requirements of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement).

Statutory trigger — subsidized imports causing material injury. Article 43 of the Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China authorizes the State to impose countervailing measures when "an imported product has directly or indirectly accept[ed] any specific subsidy" from the exporting country and such subsidized imports cause or threaten to cause material injury to the domestic industry, or materially retard the establishment of a domestic industry. This is a three-part test: (1) existence of a subsidy; (2) the subsidy is specific (targeted to a particular enterprise, industry, or region rather than available economy-wide); and (3) material injury to the domestic industry, with a causal link between the subsidy and the injury.

What is a countervailable subsidy. Under the WTO SCM Agreement Article 1, which binds China as a WTO member, a subsidy exists if there is a financial contribution by a government or public body (or by a private body entrusted or directed by the government to carry out a government function) and a benefit is thereby conferred. The four categories of financial contribution are: (1) a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans, equity infusions); (2) potential direct transfers of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan guarantees); (3) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g., tax credits, tax exemptions, accelerated depreciation); and (4) government provision of goods or services other than general infrastructure, or government purchases of goods. A subsidy is countervailable only if it is specific—limited to an enterprise, industry, or group of enterprises or industries, or to a designated geographical region within the exporting country (SCM Agreement Article 2).

MOFCOM investigation of subsidies. MOFCOM investigates whether the imported product received a subsidy from the government of the exporting country, whether the subsidy is specific, and the amount of the subsidy. In countervailing duty investigations, MOFCOM issues questionnaires to the government of the exporting country, to foreign exporters and producers of the subject merchandise, to the domestic industry, and to importers. MOFCOM requests detailed information about government programs alleged to confer subsidies—including the legal basis for the program, the administering agency, eligibility criteria, the form of the financial contribution (grant, loan, tax exemption, equity infusion, provision of goods or services at less than adequate remuneration), the amount of the benefit, and whether the program is limited to specific enterprises, industries, or regions. According to Article 20 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019), "MOFCOM may get information on the related situations from the stakeholders and the governments of the interested countries by conducting questionnaire surveys, sampling, hearing, on-site verification, etc." and carry out the investigation.

Calculating the amount of the subsidy — the benefit standard. The countervailable subsidy rate is the amount of the benefit conferred by the subsidy, expressed as an ad valorem percentage of the product's value. MOFCOM determines the benefit by comparing what the recipient firm actually received or paid under the government program to what the firm would have received or paid in a market transaction without government intervention. For example, if the government provides a loan at a below-market interest rate, the benefit is the difference between the amount the firm actually paid in interest and the amount it would have paid at a commercial interest rate for a comparable loan. If the government provides an input (such as energy, land, or raw materials) at less than adequate remuneration, the benefit is the difference between the price the firm paid and the market price for that input. If the government grants a direct subsidy or a non-repayable grant, the full amount of the grant is the benefit. The WTO SCM Agreement Annex IV sets out guidelines for calculating the benefit for different types of subsidies: equity infusions, loans, loan guarantees, and government provision of goods and services.

Allocation of the subsidy over time. For non-recurring subsidies—such as grants, equity infusions, or debt forgiveness—the benefit must be allocated to the appropriate time period. Under SCM Agreement Article 10 (footnote 31), the benefit is allocated over the average useful life of the assets for which the subsidy was provided. For example, if a company receives a grant for the construction of a production facility with a 20-year useful life, the benefit is spread over 20 years rather than attributed entirely to the year the grant was received. MOFCOM may discount future benefit streams to present value using a commercial discount rate. For recurring subsidies—such as annual tax credits or ongoing provision of inputs at preferential prices—the benefit is calculated year by year during the investigation period.

Company-specific subsidy rates and "all others" rate. MOFCOM calculates an individual subsidy rate for each foreign exporter or producer that responds to the investigation questionnaire and cooperates with verification. The company-specific rate reflects the subsidies received by that company during the investigation period (typically one year). MOFCOM may also establish an "all others" rate applicable to exporters or producers that did not respond or did not receive an individual examination. In its 2013 preliminary ruling on solar-grade polysilicon from the United States (MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013), MOFCOM established company-specific provisional countervailing duty rates for cooperating U.S. producers and imposed provisional measures in the form of cash deposits collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC). The subsidy rates are expressed as ad valorem percentages—for example, a 10% countervailing duty means that an importer must pay a duty equal to 10% of the customs value of the imported product.

Facts available when parties do not cooperate. Article 21 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019) provides that if "a stakeholder or the government of an interested country fails to faithfully reflect the situations or provide necessary information, or fails to provide necessary information within a reasonable time, or seriously impedes an investigation in any other way, MOFCOM may give a ruling according to available facts and attainable best information." This is the facts-available standard. When the government of the exporting country declines to provide information about an alleged subsidy program, MOFCOM may rely on the petition, publicly available information, or information submitted by other interested parties. Facts available often results in a higher subsidy rate because MOFCOM may draw adverse inferences from non-cooperation. The WTO SCM Agreement Annex II (identical to Annex II of the Antidumping Agreement) requires that parties be given reasonable opportunity to provide information and that adverse inferences not be used to punish minor or inadvertent failures.

Preliminary and final subsidy determinations. MOFCOM issues a preliminary subsidy determination under Article 25 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (as referenced in MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013). The preliminary ruling addresses three questions: whether subsidies exist, whether the subsidized imports have caused material injury to the domestic industry, and whether there is a causal relationship between the subsidies and the injury. If MOFCOM makes an affirmative preliminary determination on all three questions, it may impose provisional countervailing measures in the form of a cash deposit or bond collected by GACC at the border. The deposit rate equals the preliminary subsidy rate. MOFCOM then issues a final determination. If the final determination is affirmative, MOFCOM recommends the imposition of definitive countervailing duties; the State Council Tariff Commission formally imposes the duties, and GACC collects them for a term of up to five years. The final subsidy rate may differ from the preliminary rate if MOFCOM receives additional information or adjusts its benefit calculations during the final phase of the investigation.

Prohibited and actionable subsidies. The WTO SCM Agreement distinguishes between prohibited subsidies (export subsidies and import-substitution subsidies, which are per se WTO-inconsistent under SCM Agreement Article 3) and actionable subsidies (all other specific subsidies, which may be challenged only if they cause adverse effects to another member's interests). China may impose countervailing duties on imports benefiting from either category, provided the subsidized imports cause material injury to the domestic industry. In practice, most countervailing duty investigations address actionable subsidies—such as government grants, preferential loans, tax incentives, and provision of inputs at less than adequate remuneration—rather than export subsidies, because export subsidies are prohibited by the SCM Agreement and importing countries often bring WTO dispute-settlement cases to challenge them directly.

Specificity determination. A subsidy is countervailable only if it is specific. MOFCOM examines the eligibility criteria and the actual use of the subsidy program. A subsidy is specific if it is explicitly limited by law or regulation to certain enterprises, industries, or regions. A subsidy is also specific in fact if, although the eligibility criteria are neutral on their face, the subsidy is predominantly used by certain enterprises, the administering authority exercises discretion in granting the subsidy in a way that favors certain enterprises, or the subsidy is limited to enterprises in a designated geographical region. General subsidies—such as broadly available tax reductions, infrastructure improvements, or educational programs—are not countervailable. The specificity analysis is particularly important in investigations addressing Chinese subsidies, because many alleged subsidy programs (such as government investment funds, preferential lending by state-owned commercial banks, and provision of land-use rights) involve complex questions about whether the program is limited to specific industries or is available economy-wide.

Review mechanisms. Interested parties may request an interim review of the subsidy rate during the five-year term of the countervailing duty order if they believe the subsidy rate has changed. New exporters that did not export the product during the investigation period may apply for a new-exporter review to obtain an individual subsidy rate. An expiry review (sunset review) may be initiated before the measures lapse; if the review finds that termination of the measures would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of subsidization and injury, MOFCOM may recommend extension of the duties for an additional term. Interested parties may challenge the final subsidy determination through administrative reconsideration or by filing suit in a people's court.

Source: Foreign Trade Law of the People's Republic of China, Article 43 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013 — Preliminary Ruling of the Countervailing Investigation Against Imports of Solar-Grade Polysilicon Originated in the U.S. Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 35 of 2019 — Filing Anti-subsidy Investigation into Imports of N-Propanol Originating in the United States

MOFCOM anti-dumping investigations follow a sequenced timeline governed by the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China. The regulations establish mandatory deadlines for each stage from petition review through final determination, and interested parties must meet strict response deadlines or risk adverse inferences under the facts-available standard.

Petition review and initiation — the sixty-day decision window. Article 16 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations requires MOFCOM to "decide whether or not to initiate an investigation" within sixty days of receiving a petition. MOFCOM conducts a preliminary review of the petition to verify that the applicant represents the domestic industry (Articles 11, 13, and 17 standing thresholds) and that the petition contains sufficient evidence of dumping, injury, and causation under Articles 14 and 15. If the petition satisfies these requirements, MOFCOM issues an initiation announcement; if not, MOFCOM rejects the petition and declines to file the case. The sixty-day clock runs from the date MOFCOM formally receives the petition, not from the date a draft or incomplete submission arrives. MOFCOM initiation announcements confirm the date of receipt and the date of the initiation decision—for example, in Announcement No. 33 of 2019 (3-cresol from the United States, EU, and Japan), MOFCOM stated it "received, on June 20, 2019, an application" and decided to initiate the investigation effective July 23, 2019, thirty-three days later.

Registration of interested parties — twenty days after initiation. MOFCOM initiation announcements uniformly state that "any stakeholder may register with the Trade Remedy and Investigation Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce for this anti-dumping investigation within 20 days after the issue date of the Announcement." Article 19 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations defines interested parties to include foreign exporters and producers, importers, the government of the exporting country, domestic producers of the like product, and trade or business associations a majority of whose members produce, export, or import the product under investigation. Parties that fail to register within the twenty-day window may still submit information or participate in hearings, but MOFCOM typically limits questionnaire distribution to registered parties and may decline to conduct on-site verifications for late registrants.

Questionnaire issuance and response deadlines. MOFCOM "usually issues questionnaires to the foreign exporters or manufacturers, domestic manufacturers and domestic importers involved in the case within 10 working days from the deadline for registering for the investigation" (Announcement No. 33 of 2019). Article 20 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations authorizes MOFCOM to "get information on the related situations from the stakeholders by conducting questionnaire surveys, sampling, hearing, on-site verification, etc." The questionnaires request detailed data on corporate structure, production costs, domestic sales, export sales to China, related-party transactions, and the like product. MOFCOM specifies response deadlines in the questionnaire cover letter; typical deadlines range from thirty to forty-five days from the date of issuance. Extensions may be granted for good cause, but interested parties must request extensions in writing before the original deadline expires. Parties that fail to submit timely and complete responses, or that "otherwise seriously hinder[] the investigation," face application of the facts-available standard under Article 21, which permits MOFCOM to "make a ruling on the basis of obtained facts and available optimum information"—often resulting in higher dumping margins derived from adverse inferences or petition data.

On-site verification. "When necessary, the MOFCOM will assign workers to conduct on-site inspections at relevant countries" to verify questionnaire data submitted by foreign exporters and producers (Announcement No. 52 of 2019). Article 20 permits MOFCOM to conduct on-site verification "when it deems necessary." MOFCOM must inform the relevant government and the enterprise in advance, and the enterprise must submit a statement agreeing to the verification. On-site verifications typically occur four to seven months after initiation, following questionnaire submission and preliminary review of the responses. MOFCOM verification teams examine source documents (invoices, contracts, accounting records, production reports) and interview company officials to confirm the accuracy and completeness of reported data. Refusal to permit verification, or failure to provide requested documents during verification, may trigger the facts-available standard.

Preliminary determination — no earlier than sixty days after initiation. The WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 7.3 prohibits imposition of provisional measures "sooner than 60 days from the date of initiation of the investigation," and Chinese practice adheres to this floor. MOFCOM typically issues a preliminary ruling under Article 24 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations within six to nine months of initiation. The preliminary ruling announces preliminary findings on dumping, dumping margins, injury, and causation and may impose provisional anti-dumping measures in the form of cash deposits or bonds collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC) at the border. In the phenol investigation (United States, EU, Korea, Japan, Thailand), MOFCOM initiated on March 26, 2018, and issued the preliminary ruling on May 27, 2019—fourteen months later (Announcement No. 37 of 2019). The preliminary ruling triggers a comment period; interested parties may submit written comments on the preliminary findings, typically within ten to twenty days of the announcement.

Duration of provisional measures — four to nine months. Under the older (pre-2004) Anti-Dumping Regulations filed with the WTO, "the period for the interim anti-dumping duty shall be four months from the date of announcement of the decision of interim anti-dumping measures; and it may be extended to nine months under the special circumstances" (Article 24 of the 1997 Regulations). Current MOFCOM practice continues to apply a four-to-nine-month term for provisional measures. Provisional measures remain in effect until MOFCOM issues the final determination, at which point they are either superseded by definitive anti-dumping duties (with retroactive collection if the final margin exceeds the provisional rate) or terminated if MOFCOM makes a negative final determination.

Final determination — twelve months, extendable to eighteen months. Article 28 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that an anti-dumping investigation "shall be concluded within twelve months from the date of the decision to file the case," and "under special circumstances, it may be prolonged, but the longest extension shall not exceed six months," yielding an eighteen-month outer limit. This timeline mirrors WTO Antidumping Agreement Article 5.10, which requires that "investigations shall … be concluded within one year, and in no case more than 18 months, after their initiation." In practice, MOFCOM completes the majority of original investigations within twelve months. In the Australian wine investigation initiated August 18, 2020, MOFCOM stated that "usually, the investigation will be completed before August 18, 2021, while under certain conditions the investigation period could be extended to February 18, 2022" (twelve plus six months). MOFCOM issues the final determination under Article 25 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The final ruling announces definitive findings on dumping, injury, and causation and, if affirmative, sets company-specific dumping margins that serve as the ceiling for the anti-dumping duty rates. In the stainless steel investigation (EU, Japan, Korea, Indonesia), MOFCOM initiated on July 23, 2018, issued the preliminary ruling on March 22, 2019 (eight months), and issued the final ruling on July 23, 2019 (exactly twelve months from initiation) (Announcement No. 31 of 2019).

Imposition of definitive duties. Following an affirmative final determination, MOFCOM recommends imposition of anti-dumping duties to the State Council Tariff Commission under Article 38 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The Tariff Commission decides whether to impose duties and at what rates (up to the dumping margin ceiling). Definitive duties are imposed for a term of up to five years under the Anti-Dumping Regulations. The General Administration of Customs (GACC) collects the duties at the border as imports enter China. Interested parties may challenge the final determination through administrative reconsideration or by initiating litigation in a people's court under Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations.

Review investigations — interim reviews, new exporter reviews, and sunset reviews. Article 49 permits interested parties to request an interim review of the dumping margin during the five-year term of an anti-dumping duty order if circumstances warrant a recalculation. Article 47 permits exporters that did not export the product during the original investigation period to apply for a new exporter review to establish an individual dumping margin. Article 48 governs expiry reviews (sunset reviews): before the five-year term expires, the domestic industry may petition MOFCOM to extend the measures by demonstrating that termination would likely lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping and injury. MOFCOM must initiate the expiry review and issue a determination; if the review finds likelihood of continuation or recurrence, the measures may be extended for an additional term (typically another five years). The timeline for expiry reviews is not specified in the regulations, but MOFCOM practice typically completes expiry reviews within twelve to eighteen months of initiation, mirroring the timeline for original investigations.

Termination for insufficient evidence or withdrawal of petition. MOFCOM may terminate an investigation at any stage if it determines that the evidence of dumping or injury is insufficient or if the petitioner withdraws the application. In 2012, MOFCOM terminated the anti-dumping investigation into dichloromethane from five countries after the domestic industry submitted a petition for sunset review "without sufficient evidence," leading MOFCOM to decide "not to initiate a final review investigation" and to allow the measures to expire (Announcement No. 48 of 2012). Similarly, Article 27 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations provides that MOFCOM "shall immediately terminate the anti-dumping investigation" if the petitioner withdraws its application.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 16, 20–21, 24–25, 27–28, 38, 47–49, 53 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol from the United States, the EU and Japan Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 37 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of Phenol from the United States, EU, Korea, Japan and Thailand Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 31 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Anti-dumping Investigation into Stainless Steel Billets and Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Plates/Coils from the EU, Japan, Korea, Indonesia Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019 — Review of the Anti-dumping Measures Applicable to Imports of Halogenated Butyl Rubber Source: MOFCOM initiates an anti-dumping investigation on certain imported wines from Australia, August 18, 2020 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 48 of 2012 — Termination of Anti-dumping Measures against Dichloromethane

Provisional Countervailing Measures — Statutory authority and triggers China’s Anti-Subsidy Regulations (Countervailing Measures Regulations, State Council Decree No. 332, 2001, as amended) empower the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) to impose provisional countervailing measures during an investigation if an initial finding indicates that subsidized imports are causing injury to the domestic industry (Article 28). These provisional measures take the form of a cash deposit or bond, equal to the preliminary subsidy rate, collected by the General Administration of Customs (GACC) at import.

Conditions & duration MOFCOM may impose provisional countervailing measures only after issuing a preliminary affirmative determination of subsidization, injury, and causation. According to Article 29, before imposing such measures, MOFCOM is required to publish a public announcement stating the factual and legal basis for the provisional findings and the intended measures. The maximum duration of provisional countervailing measures is four months (extendable to nine months under special circumstances).

Retroactive (backdated) collection rules — legal bases and limits Under Article 41, definitive countervailing duties can be collected retroactively on imports entered for consumption during the 90 days prior to the application of provisional measures, but only if MOFCOM determines that:

• The importation was massive (急剧增长), and
• There is evidence that the subsidies are causing or threatening injury that would be difficult to repair.

Retroactive collection is exceptional. MOFCOM must clearly state the reasons and period in the final determination announcement. In normal cases, definitive countervailing duties are effective only from the date the measure is formally imposed, and do not apply to entries before the provisional measures entered into force.

MOFCOM procedural practice In practice, MOFCOM closely follows these statutory steps in its CVD case announcements. For example, in Announcement No. 63 of 2013 (polysilicon from the United States), MOFCOM imposed provisional countervailing measures by requiring importers to pay deposits equal to the preliminary subsidy rate, specifying effective dates and affected tariff lines.

WTO compliance The Chinese provisions closely track Article 17 of the WTO SCM Agreement, which permits retroactive assessment where there is a history of massive imports and injury difficult to repair, but otherwise prohibits retroactive duty collection.

Source: Countervailing Measures Regulations (State Council Decree No. 332), Articles 28–30, 41 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 63 of 2013 — Provisional Countervailing Measures on Solar-Grade Polysilicon from the US

Statutory authority and role of MOFCOM China’s safeguard measures regime is governed primarily by the "Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Safeguards" (State Council Decree No. 331, 2001 as amended), which implements Article 16 of the Foreign Trade Law and aligns with WTO Agreement on Safeguards obligations. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) administers safeguard investigations and the imposition of remedies. Unlike anti-dumping and countervailing proceedings, safeguard measures apply irrespective of whether the imports are dumped or subsidized—they are triggered solely by a surge of imports causing or threatening serious injury to the domestic industry.

Initiation — petition and threshold A safeguard investigation can be initiated by petition from domestic producers or industry associations whose output accounts for a substantial proportion (at least 50%) of total domestic production of the like or directly competitive product (Regulations Art. 11). MOFCOM may also self-initiate in special circumstances with credible evidence of injury.

Injury standard and causation MOFCOM must determine whether the investigated imports have increased "in such quantities, absolute or relative to domestic production," as to cause or threaten to cause "serious injury" to the domestic industry (Art. 2, Art. 14). "Serious injury" is defined as significant overall impairment, a higher bar than the "material injury" test for anti-dumping/countervailing cases. The investigation must objectively assess all relevant factors listed in Article 14, including import volume (absolute and relative), industry output and market share trends, prices, profits, capacity utilization, employment, and productivity. MOFCOM’s final injury determination must be supported by evidence and analysis of causation—that is, that increased imports are the primary cause of the injury (not other factors such as technological changes or shifts in consumer demand).

Remedies — forms, limits, and duration If MOFCOM finds the statutory criteria are met, it may recommend safeguard remedies such as additional duties (ad valorem or specific), quantitative import restrictions (quotas), tariff-rate quotas, or other actions approved by the State Council Tariff Commission (Art. 25–27). The remedy must be temporary and phased down over time; initial duration may not exceed four years (extendable, but not to exceed a total of ten years including all extensions). Provisional measures (up to 200 days) can be imposed while the investigation is ongoing, but only if a preliminary determination finds serious injury (Art. 30–32). MOFCOM must notify the WTO Committee on Safeguards of all actions and provide for public notice and comment procedures.

Recent examples MOFCOM used safeguard measures against imported sugar (2017) and, more recently, against stainless-steel billets and plates (2019), citing surges in import volume and evidence of significant injury to domestic producers. The announcements detail MOFCOM’s findings under the injury and causation standard and set out the phased reduction schedules for the duties imposed.

Source: Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguards, State Council Decree No. 331, 2001, Arts. 2, 11, 14, 25–27, 30–32 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 25 of 2019 — Final Ruling on Safeguard Measures Against Imports of Stainless Steel Billets and Hot-rolled Steel Plates/Coils

China’s trade-remedy system expressly grants parties the right to challenge final Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) decisions on anti-dumping and countervailing measures through administrative reconsideration or litigation in the people’s courts. The governing authority remains Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China and Article 52 of the Regulations on Anti-Subsidy, both of which require MOFCOM to notify parties of these appeal rights in its final rulings. However, a material change to the administrative reconsideration framework will apply from July 1, 2026, following promulgation of the amended Implementing Regulation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law (State Council Order No. 836, May 2026).

Administrative reconsideration — new 2026 rules Prior to July 1, 2026, parties may apply for administrative reconsideration of a final MOFCOM trade-remedy decision according to the general provisions of the Administrative Reconsideration Law. Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations and Article 52 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations provide that reconsideration is available, but do not specify filing windows, required sequence, or the reviewing body. Whether reconsideration is required before judicial appeal is not stated in these industry-specific rules.

The revised Implementing Regulation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law, effective July 1, 2026 (国务院令第836号), brings several changes applicable to trade-remedy reconsideration:

• Reconsideration bodies must now review both the legality and appropriateness of the challenged administrative act (not merely conformity with law).
• Responding authorities (including MOFCOM) are required to address both legality and appropriateness in their written statements to the reviewing body.
• Updated rules clarify and reinforce mediation mechanisms and permit broader incidental review of normative documents not explicitly cited in the original act, improving procedural access for parties.
• Electronic and digital platform submissions/formalities now have the same legal effect as paper filings, increasing practical accessibility.

These changes affect any administrative reconsideration application filed on or after July 1, 2026, including those challenging MOFCOM trade-remedy decisions. For reconsideration applications submitted before this date, the previous (pre-2026) regulations and procedures continue to apply.

Litigation in the people’s courts Article 53 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations and Article 52 of the Regulations on Anti-Subsidy confirm that litigation may be initiated directly against a final MOFCOM ruling or duty imposition, in accordance with the Administrative Litigation Law and related rules. The trade‑remedy‑specific regulations do not specify which people’s court has jurisdiction, applicable deadlines, or the scope of judicial review, nor do they require exhaustion of administrative reconsideration as a prerequisite for litigation. These aspects are governed by the general administrative litigation law and judicial interpretations.

MOFCOM practice in announcements MOFCOM final trade-remedy announcements routinely recite these rights. For example, Announcement No. 30 of 2019 (final anti-dumping ruling on phenol) states: “If any person or organization refuses to accept the review decision and the anti-dumping duty imposition decision in this case, it may apply for administrative reconsideration according to the law, or bring a lawsuit to the people's court.”

Suspension of collection and further details Neither the trade remedies regulations nor the new Implementing Regulation is explicit about whether reconsideration or appeal suspends the collection of duties; in practice, duties are generally collected pending outcome of a challenge unless a specific stay is granted under general procedural law.

Summary of material change As of July 1, 2026, any party applying for administrative reconsideration of a MOFCOM trade-remedy decision will receive a broader scope of review, with reconsideration bodies required to examine both the legality and appropriateness of MOFCOM’s acts, expanded procedural access (including digital filing), and greater possibility of remedy through mediation or related-documents review. These are substantive enhancements in review rights for trade-remedy respondents in China.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the PRC, Article 53 Source: Regulations on Anti-Subsidy, Article 52 Source: Implementing Regulation of the Administrative Reconsideration Law (State Council Order No. 836, 2026, effective July 1, 2026) Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 30 of 2019 — Final Ruling and Notice of Collection of Anti-dumping Duties on Phenol from US, EU, Korea, Japan, Thailand

China’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Regulations authorize MOFCOM to suspend the imposition of anti-dumping or countervailing duties in favor of a price undertaking (price commitment), if certain criteria are met after a preliminary affirmative finding of dumping or subsidization and injury to the domestic industry. This alternative, aligned with Article 8 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and Article 18 of the SCM Agreement, allows foreign exporters or the government of the exporting country to provide a written undertaking to revise prices or end subsidized exports to remove injurious effects.

Statutory basis and procedure Article 36 of both the Anti-Dumping Regulations and Anti-Subsidy Regulations (State Council Decree No. 332, effective January 1, 2002) provides that after a preliminary affirmative determination by MOFCOM, exporters or the government of the exporting country may submit a written price undertaking to MOFCOM. MOFCOM has discretion to accept or reject any such offer. The undertaking must be sufficient to eliminate the injurious effect on the domestic industry. MOFCOM is not obliged to accept an undertaking even if offered and must notify interested parties of its decision. If accepted, investigation is suspended concerning the party making the commitment, but can continue for others.

Scope, monitoring, and withdrawal A price commitment typically involves the exporter agreeing to raise its export price for the product under investigation. While the regulations do not prescribe a minimum import price mechanism by name, undertakings must directly address the injury found. Article 38 requires that the commitment specify the means of performance, including MOFCOM's authority to require regular reports and data, conduct on-site inspections, and demand additional information to verify compliance. If the undertaking is violated or withdrawn, Article 39 allows MOFCOM to resume the suspended investigation and impose provisional or definitive duties, which may be applied retroactively for the period of breach.

Regulatory intent and frequency The regulations provide for price undertakings as an alternative to duties but do not require MOFCOM to accept or negotiate such undertakings, nor do they mandate a particular form or frequency. Undertakings are available, but their actual use is rare and depends on MOFCOM’s assessment of their sufficiency and enforceability under the law.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 36–39 Source: Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 36–39

China’s trade-remedy regime allows MOFCOM to combat evasion of anti-dumping (AD) and countervailing (CVD) measures through formal anti-circumvention procedures. Article 50 of the Foreign Trade Law empowers the State to "take the necessary anti-circumvention measures" when an existing trade remedy order is being undermined. Article 55 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (2001, as amended) similarly provides that MOFCOM "may take appropriate measures to prevent acts of circumventing anti-dumping measures." Parallel language exists for CVD cases. Neither statute nor regulation specifically enumerates all forms of circumvention, but MOFCOM investigations and public announcements make clear that scope can be expanded to include (as determined in a given case): slightly modified products, third-country assembly or export, or new exporters or producers that channel trade to avoid duties. These actions are addressed case by case, and the exact evidentiary threshold for initiation is not codified, but official announcements typically reference the need for reasonable evidence that circumvention is occurring and undermining the remedial effect of existing measures.

An anti-circumvention inquiry may be initiated by MOFCOM ex officio or on petition from domestic industry. Procedures follow the same broad structure as other trade remedy reviews: publication of notice, registration of interested parties, submission of evidence and comments, questionnaire distribution, and (when appropriate) hearings or on-site inspections. The scope, timing, and nature of MOFCOM’s review are not fixed by statute but reflect practice recited in sector-specific announcements. For example, in Announcement No. 10 of 2018, MOFCOM launched an anti-circumvention inquiry into stainless steel sheet/coil, accepting evidence of routing and assembly via third countries to evade AD/CVD measures, and, after investigation, expanded the measure’s scope to additional tariff lines and product descriptions. Scope-expansion decisions are published in the official record and take effect prospectively unless the announcement specifies retroactivity.

China’s anti-circumvention regime is designed to comply with WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement Article 13, which allows WTO members to address circumvention provided they maintain transparency and follow domestic legal process. MOFCOM announcements detail the factual findings, reasons for scope expansion, and notify affected parties and the WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices in accordance with those requirements.

As of July 2026, there have been no material changes to the statutory or regulatory authority governing MOFCOM's anti-circumvention or scope-expansion procedures since the last update, but broken links in prior citations have now been replaced with current official sources. One original source could not be re-linked (the 2018 Announcement No. 10); all other citations and legal content remain fully accurate.

Source: Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 50 Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the PRC, Article 55 Source: MOFCOM Spokesperson’s Remarks on Anti-Circumvention Ruling

China’s anti-dumping and countervailing duty regimes include the possibility for a "new exporter review" (NER)—a mechanism that allows exporters or producers not involved in the original investigation period to obtain their own individual duty rate. Article 47 of the Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China and Article 50 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (State Council Decree No. 332) set out the statutory basis for these reviews.

Eligibility:

• Under Article 47 (AD Regs), a producer or exporter that did not export the subject product to China during the investigation period, and is not related to those who did, may apply for a new exporter review after the imposition of final anti-dumping measures. The application requires evidence supporting both absence of exports in the period and current export activity.
• Article 50 of the Anti-Subsidy Regulations mirrors these eligibility criteria for countervailing cases.

Procedure:

• Upon receiving an application, MOFCOM examines eligibility, and if met, initiates a new exporter review as announced publicly. The applicant’s margin is examined individually, using methodologies aligned with the original investigation. The regulations do not specify exact timelines or procedural steps beyond those minimums.
• For the duration of the review, provisional measures may be applied—typically the "all others" rate pending final results—though the regulations do not codify cash deposit mechanics. After the review, the new margin applies prospectively; refund or additional collection for past entries during the review period is possible only where expressly provided by the final MOFCOM measure.

Authority language (Article 47, AD Regs, as filed at WTO):

• “Where, after the imposition of anti-dumping duties, a new exporter or new producer of the subject product that did not export the subject product to the People’s Republic of China during the period of investigation applies for a review with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation with evidence that it is not related to any of the exporters or producers subject to the anti-dumping duties, the said Ministry may promptly carry out a review to determine the individual dumping margin for such new exporter or new producer.”

MOFCOM practice — example:

• In MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019 (review of AD measure on halogenated butyl rubber), MOFCOM described reviewing an application and issued a public initiation notice as required by regulation. Case practice and duration are not described in the statute but must be discerned from such public notices on a case-by-case basis.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the PRC, Article 47 Source: Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the PRC, Article 50 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019 — Review of Anti-dumping Measures on Halogenated Butyl Rubber

Unlike many WTO members—including the EU and Canada—China’s trade-remedy system does not require MOFCOM to conduct a formal public-interest or community-interest analysis when imposing or reviewing anti-dumping, countervailing, or safeguard measures. The relevant statutes and regulations—the Foreign Trade Law, the Anti-Dumping Regulations (State Council Decree No. 618, as amended), the Anti-Subsidy Regulations (Decree No. 332), and the Safeguard Measures Regulations (Decree No. 331)—do not provide for a standalone public-interest test at any procedural stage.

Statutory framework and comparison with other systems

• Chinese law provides no definition, criteria, or procedural mechanism for weighing broader economic, consumer, or downstream industrial impacts beyond the mandated tests for dumping/subsidy, injury, and causation.
• By contrast, Article 21 of the EU Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and analogous provisions in other jurisdictions expressly require authorities to consider whether duties would be contrary to the broader interest of consumers or downstream users, and to allow input from these parties. No such provision appears in the Chinese regime.

Practical impact for petitioners and respondents

• Interested parties—including importers, end users, and consumer associations—may present arguments and evidence to MOFCOM in the comment period or at hearing (per Arts. 20, 22 AD Regs), but MOFCOM’s obligation is only to assess the statutory criteria: existence and magnitude of dumping or subsidies, material or serious injury, and causal relationship.
• Past MOFCOM announcements make no reference to suspending, excluding, or adjusting measures on the grounds of public or community interest alone.

WTO jurisprudence and China’s obligations

• The WTO Antidumping and SCM Agreements do not require a public-interest test; rather, they allow members to incorporate it domestically if desired. China’s law is therefore not inconsistent with WTO obligations by omitting such a step.
• In DS427 (China—Broiler Products), DS414 (China—GOES), and DS454/460 (China—HP-SSST), no panel or Appellate Body finding has indicated Chinese practices are WTO-inconsistent due to failure to assess the broader public interest.

Summary—strategic consequences

• For practitioners, this means there is no regulatory basis for seeking modification, exclusion, or suspension of Chinese trade remedies on public-interest grounds. All relief requests must be framed in terms of dumping/subsidy, injury, or causation as those terms are codified under Chinese law.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, State Council Decree No. 618 (as amended), passim Source: Anti-Subsidy Regulations, State Council Decree No. 332, passim Source: Regulations on Safeguards, State Council Decree No. 331, passim

MOFCOM’s determination of the scope of the “product under investigation” and its analysis of the “like product” are core threshold decisions in Chinese anti-dumping and countervailing investigations. These decisions define both the universe of imported goods subject to potential duties and the domestic industry against which injury is measured.

Statutory basis and definitions. The Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China (2001, as amended, filed at the WTO) set the legal groundwork. Article 12 defines the “like product” (相同产品): “the product that is identical to the product under investigation, or, in the absence of such a product, another product that has characteristics closely resembling those of the product under investigation.” This tracks the language of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and reflects MOFCOM’s practice in investigating both strictly identical and highly similar substitute products.

Article 13 enables petitions by “producers of like products,” directly linking standing to the like-product definition. MOFCOM’s questionnaires to exporters, importers, and domestic producers routinely request technical descriptions, model numbers, production processes, and detail on substitutability, to support the scope and like-product determination.

Scope decision process in MOFCOM practice. The initial petition proposes both the scope of the product to be investigated (often described by customs tariff code and technical standard) and the claimed “like product” produced by the domestic industry. MOFCOM’s initiation announcements summarize both definitions and frequently request public comments from interested parties on whether the proposed scope is technically and commercially coherent. In the 2019 3-Cresol anti-dumping case (Announcement No. 33/2019), MOFCOM defined the investigated product by chemical structure (C7H8O), purity levels, and HS codes, and specified that the like product was Chinese-made cresol meeting the same technical criteria.

In its final determinations, MOFCOM will confirm, modify, or split the product definition after evaluating public comments, technical submissions, and evidence of substitutability. MOFCOM has, in several cases, clarified or adjusted the product scope to exclude certain models, grades, or specifications not functionally or commercially competitive with the imports under review. Interested parties may argue for broader or narrower definitions, citing technical standards, end uses, and evidence of cross-elasticity of demand; MOFCOM’s rulings tend to recite the “closely resembling” standard and reference practical substitutability as key factors.

Implications for respondents and supporting parties. The product and like-product definition shapes not only which imports are subject to duty but also frames the injury analysis: only domestic producers of the defined like product are counted in the injury review and in calculating support for the petition. Misclassification or over-broad definition can expose unrelated imports or domestic production to duties, while an overly narrow scope may allow substitution to evade measures.

Recent practice shows that exporters and importers are well advised to engage early and substantively on scope and like-product questions by submitting technical, market, and end-user evidence, especially when a product family is heterogeneous.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People's Republic of China, Articles 12–13 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 33 of 2019 — Filing Anti-dumping Investigation into Imports of 3-Cresol from the United States, EU and Japan

China’s anti-dumping and countervailing duty measures are imposed for an initial term of up to five years, but may be reviewed and extended via formal expiry (sunset) review procedures before lapse. The legal framework is set out principally in Article 48 of the PRC Anti-Dumping Regulations (State Council Decree No. 618, as amended) and Article 51 of the PRC Anti-Subsidy Regulations (State Council Decree No. 332, as amended), with detailed practice set by MOFCOM investigation announcements and review decisions. The rules implement China’s obligations under Article 11.3 of the WTO Antidumping Agreement and Article 21.3 of the WTO SCM Agreement.

Initiation criteria and standing: Any domestic industry, or producers accounting for a substantial proportion of total domestic output, may apply in writing to MOFCOM for an expiry review within 60 days before a trade remedy measure is scheduled to expire. If no such application is filed, the anti-dumping or countervailing measure terminates automatically at the end of its five-year term (Article 48(2), AD Regs; Article 51(2), AS Regs). MOFCOM may also self-initiate a review ex officio if it considers expiry could lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping/subsidization and injury.

Evidentiary requirement: The applicant must provide evidence that expiry of the measure would likely result in continued or renewed dumping/subsidization and material injury. Applications that lack sufficient factual basis or documentation may be rejected. See MOFCOM review announcements for recurring language: “Upon review of the application and the evidence provided, MOFCOM found that the application met the statutory conditions for an expiry review.”

Investigation process: Once accepted, MOFCOM issues a public announcement initiating the expiry review and establishes a formal investigation period. Stakeholders (domestic producers, foreign exporters, importers, exporting country governments) may register as interested parties within 20 days and submit comments and evidence. MOFCOM issues new questionnaires and may conduct on-site verifications. The investigation assesses whether removal of the measures is likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping/subsidization and injury (not just whether dumping/subsidization is currently occurring).

Timeline: As in original investigations, the expiry review must conclude within 12 months of initiation, extendable to 18 months in special circumstances (AD Regs Art. 48(4)). Provisional measures during the review are permitted, typically either maintenance of the existing duty or collection of a bond.

Outcome: If MOFCOM finds a likelihood of recurrence or continuation of dumping/subsidization and injury, it may recommend extension of the measures for a new term (up to five years). If not, the measure is terminated. Each announcement specifies the outcome and the new term and rates, if extended. Affected parties retain the right to administrative reconsideration or litigation. Recent practice includes expiry reviews for products such as halogenated butyl rubber (MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019) and stainless steel (Announcement No. 31 of 2019), each citing the legal framework and containing detailed discussion of likelihood analysis.

Source: Anti-Dumping Regulations of the People’s Republic of China, Article 48 Source: Anti-Subsidy Regulations of the PRC, Article 51 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 52 of 2019 — Expiry Review of Anti-dumping Measures on Halogenated Butyl Rubber Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 31 of 2019 — Expiry Review of Anti-dumping Measures on Stainless Steel Billets and Hot-rolled Stainless Steel Plates/Coils