China — Sanctions & Embargoes

China operates an increasingly layered and adaptive restrictive-measures framework composed of: (1) counter-sanctions legislation targeting foreign discriminatory measures; (2) export controls on dual-use and strategic goods; (3) entity-list mechanisms; and, as of April 2026, an expanded suite of blocking rules and foreign trade law amendments. The structure, responsibilities, and mechanics of these regimes have materially evolved since 2025.

Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL, 2021) and Implementing Regulation (March 2025). The AFSL remains the core authority for imposing countermeasures against foreign individuals and organizations involved in discriminatory actions against Chinese interests. The March 2025 State Council regulation clarifies and expands the AFSL regime, elaborating on asset freeze types, prohibited transaction categories, the designated-decision process, and remedies. The regulation grants enforcement powers to relevant departments, advising them to correct implementation gaps and enabling restrictions beyond property to a broader array of activities.

Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (UEL) (MOFCOM, September 2020). MOFCOM's UEL continues to function as a response mechanism against foreign entities acting contrary to China's national interests. Entities engaging in arms sales to Taiwan or breaching Chinese policy may face bans on trade, investment, personnel access, and financial penalties, including, e.g., the 2024 listing of major U.S. defense contractors.

Export Control Law (ECL, December 2020) and Foreign Trade Law (amended March 2026). The ECL provides a unified regulatory architecture for controlling dual-use, military, and nuclear items, with licensing, lists, and end-user controls jointly administered by the State Council and the Central Military Commission. Article 44 of the ECL authorizes reciprocal countermeasures. The Foreign Trade Law, substantially revised in March 2026, further supports these controls by explicitly anchoring China's right to take countermeasures, clarify scope, and streamline procedures related to national security and international obligations.

State Council Order No. 835 — Blocking Regulation (April 2026). On April 7, 2026, the State Council issued Order No. 835, “Regulations on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction.” This regulation consolidates and expands prior countermeasures, introducing mechanisms such as an expanded Prohibition Execution Order, a new Malicious Entity List, and increased investigatory and enforcement authority centered in the Ministry of Justice (MOJ). Order 835 provides for confidential complaints, expanded information-collection, and administrative/civil/criminal penalties for prohibited compliance with foreign restrictive measures. It strengthens China's toolkit against foreign extraterritorial application of sanctions or trade restrictions.

Administering agencies and interaction. Overall administration is shared among the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AFSL countermeasures), MOFCOM (UEL, export controls), MOJ (blocking regulation enforcement), and the General Administration of Customs (border enforcement). Key developments since 2025 include explicit cross-ministry coordination and a trend toward publishing more actionable list-based designations.

Summary of updates. Since 2025, two material changes have occurred: (1) the adoption of State Council Order 835 (blocking regulation) expanding extraterritorial-response powers and administrative tools (April 2026), and (2) the amendment of the Foreign Trade Law (March 2026) supporting the legal structure for both export restrictions and counter-sanctions. These reflect a sharper and broader Chinese response to perceived foreign coercive actions, with new avenues for list-based designations, process, and remedies.

Source: Law of the People's Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions (adopted June 10, 2021) Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, effective March 24, 2025) Source: Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020, September 19, 2020) Source: Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020) Source: Regulations on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (State Council Order No. 835, April 2026) Source: Foreign Trade Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended March 2026)

China's blocking statute regime has materially changed and operationalized in 2026. The framework now consists of two complementary authorities: (1) the 2021 "Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures" (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021), and (2) the new Regulations on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (State Council Order No. 835, adopted April 13, 2026), which significantly expand mechanisms and enforcement.

2021 MOFCOM Blocking Rules — baseline regime (Order No. 1/2021). MOFCOM may prohibit Chinese persons from compliance with foreign legal measures deemed to be unjustified extraterritorial application. Key features remain mandatory reporting of affected situations, the ability to issue prohibition (blocking) orders, and civil liability for violating such orders (Articles 5-9). Until 2026, these powers were mostly theoretical, as no prohibition orders were published.

2026 update — State Council Order No. 835 and first enforcement actions. On April 13, 2026, China’s State Council issued "Regulations on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction" (Order No. 835), effective immediately. This regulation augments the blocking rules by explicitly empowering both the State Council (Ministry of Justice as lead agency) and MOFCOM with broader investigatory, determination, and enforcement powers regarding foreign legislation or regulatory actions determined to constitute improper extraterritorial jurisdiction against China's interests. Key provisions allow:

• Case-by-case determinations of “unlawful extraterritorial jurisdiction” through a new application process (Art. 3-7, 11)
• Issuance of "blocking orders" with domestic legal effect barring compliance (Art. 5, 11)
• Confidential complaints and whistleblower processes (Art. 5)
• Civil, administrative, and criminal penalties for prohibited compliance (Art. 15-18)

Operationalization: concrete enforcement in 2026.

• First MOFCOM prohibition order (May 2, 2026): MOFCOM prohibited compliance with specific U.S. secondary sanctions against five Chinese refineries involved in third-country trade.
• Ministry of Justice determination (May 15, 2026): The Ministry barred Chinese compliance with the European Union’s Foreign Subsidy Regulation investigation into a PRC-affiliated company (Nuctech), the first test of the new process.
• Dynamic regime (April 24, 2026): MOFCOM rescinded countermeasures regarding two EU banks after the EU lifted sanctions, demonstrating ongoing review and dynamic enforcement.

Practical impact. Multinational groups with PRC operations must monitor both MOFCOM and Ministry of Justice for new prohibition orders and enforcement actions, as risk of liability or penalty for compliance with foreign sanctions has moved from theoretical to real. As of June 2026, these events mark a turning point—the Chinese blocking regime is no longer dormant, and new determinations are likely in the evolving sanctions environment.

Source: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation and Other Measures (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021) Source: Regulations on Countering Foreign Unlawful Extraterritorial Jurisdiction (State Council Order No. 835, April 13, 2026) Source: MOFCOM Announcement on Prohibition Order (May 2, 2026) Source: Ministry of Justice Announcement — Prohibition Order re: EU FSR case (May 15, 2026) Source: MOFCOM Announcement — Rescission Regarding EU Banks (April 24, 2026)

China imposes export controls and licensing requirements on critical minerals including gallium, germanium, graphite, and a growing list of rare earth elements under the authority of the Export Control Law, Foreign Trade Law, and Customs Law.

Recent material changes (late 2024–2026):

• Expanded rare earth controls: On February 18, 2025, MOFCOM and GACC (Announcement No. 18/2025) imposed export licensing requirements on seven medium and heavy rare earth elements (samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium, yttrium) as well as their compounds and alloys, effective immediately. An October 9, 2025 expansion added five more rare earth elements (holmium, erbium, thulium, europium, ytterbium), though this wave was shortly suspended, and the expanded controls are not operative until at least November 28, 2026. Companies must check the current operative announcement list for coverage as MOFCOM suspends or reactivates controls in response to international developments.
• Gallium and germanium restrictions: As of August 1, 2023, licensing requirements were imposed for all exports of gallium and germanium-related items (MOFCOM/GACC Announcement No. 23/2023, confirmed in press conferences of July 6, 2023 and November 30, 2023). On December 3, 2024, MOFCOM issued a presumptive ban on exports of gallium, germanium, and antimony to the United States (Announcement No. 46/2024). This ban was later suspended (November 2025 through November 27, 2026) in response to diplomatic negotiations, but may be reimposed—practitioners must check MOFCOM's real-time announcements specific to destination country.
• Graphite controls: Licensing requirements on certain natural graphite exports were introduced on December 1, 2023. The list of covered graphite items (and US-specific restrictions) remains subject to annual revision.
• Procedures and risk: Exporters of controlled minerals must obtain a license from MOFCOM, providing disclosure of end-use, end-user, and destination, and comply with post-licensing supervision. US-bound shipments of gallium, germanium, and antimony are generally prohibited during periods of an active ban; for other destinations, applications are reviewed but approval criteria, rates, and denials are not publicly disclosed. The compliance risk remains high for transactions involving US or allied defense/semiconductor actors, with MOFCOM reserving the right to amend, suspend, or expand controls at any time.

Summary: Since late 2024, China has (1) extended rare earth export controls, (2) imposed—and temporarily suspended—a US-specific ban on certain critical minerals, and (3) signaled further expansions and rollbacks may occur on short notice. Real-time checking of MOFCOM/GACC announcements is mandatory. Coverage and effective dates for each mineral are specific and may change with international events or ongoing trade negotiations.

Source: MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (July 6, 2023) — gallium and germanium controls Source: MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (November 30, 2023) — licensing approvals and graphite controls Source: MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (December 5, 2024) — U.S. export ban Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2024 — presumptive ban and later suspension Source: MOFCOM and GACC Announcement No. 18 of 2025 — rare-earth export controls (February 18, 2025) Source: MOFCOM and GACC Announcement on suspension of October 2025 rare earth expansion

China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) has designated foreign entities on the Unreliable Entity List (UEL) since February 2023, imposing transaction prohibitions, investment restrictions, visa bans, fines, and asset freezes. The UEL is China's primary mechanism for publicly designating foreign companies and persons deemed to endanger China's national sovereignty, security, or development interests or to suspend normal transactions with Chinese entities in violation of market principles. Designations through mid-2025 overwhelmingly target U.S. defense contractors involved in arms sales to Taiwan, though MOFCOM has also designated companies for non-defense activities including supply-chain decisions related to Xinjiang. MOFCOM has not published a consolidated, machine-readable UEL; practitioners must compile designations from individual MOFCOM announcements and spokesperson remarks.

First designations (February 16, 2023). MOFCOM announced the first-ever UEL designations on February 16, 2023, adding Lockheed Martin Corporation and Raytheon Missiles & Defense on the basis of repeated arms sales to Taiwan. The designation decision imposed the following measures: (1) prohibition of any import and export business involving China; (2) prohibition of any new investment in China; (3) prohibition of entry into China by senior management of the two entities; (4) revocation of work permits, stay status, and residence permits of senior management in China; and (5) a fine levied against each entity. MOFCOM did not publish the fine amounts. The February 2023 designations marked the first use of the UEL since the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020) entered into force on September 19, 2020.

May 2024 designations — Boeing Defense, General Atomics, General Dynamics. On May 20, 2024, MOFCOM added Boeing Defense, Space & Security, General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, and General Dynamics Land Systems to the UEL for repeatedly selling missiles, military drones, tanks, and other offensive weapons to Taiwan in violation of the One-China principle. The measures were identical to the February 2023 sanctions: prohibition of import/export activities with China, prohibition of new investment in China, prohibition of senior management entry into China, and revocation of senior management work permits and residence permits in China. MOFCOM levied a fine on Boeing Defense, Space & Security equal to double the amount of its sales contracts with Taiwan since the implementation of the UEL (i.e., since September 19, 2020), payable within 15 days of the announcement or face additional fines. The announcement did not specify the contract value or the calculated fine amount. In a May 23, 2024 MOFCOM regular press conference, a spokesperson stated that "China repeatedly and firmly opposed the US arms sales to China's Taiwan region" and that the three designated entities "have over the years repeatedly sold missiles, military drones, tanks and other offensive weapons to Taiwan, seriously undermining China's national security, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and violating the one-China principle."

The May 2024 announcement also warned Caplugs Corporation (USA) — an American company specializing in product protection — that there was evidence it had circumvented the UEL Provisions by transferring goods purchased from China to entities on the UEL. MOFCOM required Caplugs to cease such actions immediately and submit evidence to the UEL working mechanism office, or face additional legal measures. This is the first public indication that MOFCOM intends to enforce secondary sanctions or accessory liability against entities facilitating transactions with UEL-designated persons.

October 2025 designations — Saronic, Aerkomm, Oceaneering, Dedrone, TechInsights, Elbit Systems. On October 10, 2025, MOFCOM added Saronic Technologies, Inc., Aerkomm Inc., and Oceaneering International, Inc. to the UEL for engaging in military-technical cooperation with Taiwan despite China's firm opposition. In a spokesperson's remark published October 10, 2025, MOFCOM stated that the three firms' actions "seriously undermined China's national sovereignty, security, and development interests" and that the designation was made "pursuant to Article 2 of the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, as well as the Foreign Trade Law, the National Security Law, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law of the People's Republic of China." The measures took effect immediately and prohibited the entities from engaging in import or export activities related to China and barred new investments in China.

On October 16, 2025, in a MOFCOM spokesperson's remark addressing the addition of Dedrone by Axon, TechInsights Inc. and its branches, and other foreign entities to the UEL, MOFCOM stated that these entities had "engaged in so-called military-technical cooperation with China's Taiwan region, made egregious statements concerning China, and assisted foreign governments in suppressing Chinese enterprises," thereby "seriously undermining China's national sovereignty, security, and development interests." The designation was made "pursuant to Article 2 of the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List, as well as the Foreign Trade Law, the National Security Law, and the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law." The measures took effect immediately. The October 16 announcement did not enumerate all designated entities by name or specify the full list of measures beyond the statutory authorities invoked.

Restricted Name List (export-control end-user list) vs. UEL. China also maintains a Restricted Name List under the Export Control Law, distinct from the UEL. The Restricted Name List is an end-user and end-use control list that prohibits exports of dual-use items to listed entities. On October 10, 2025, MOFCOM announced the addition of three U.S. entities to the Restricted Name List for endangering China's national security and interests, stating: "To safeguard national security and interests, perform non-proliferation and other international obligations, in accordance with relevant provisions of the Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items of the People's Republic of China, China has decided to add three U.S. entities that endanger China's national security and interests to the Restricted Name List. It is strictly prohibited to export dual-use items to these entities, and no exporter shall violate the aforementioned provisions." The announcement did not identify the three U.S. entities by name. The Restricted Name List is administered under the Export Control Law and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, rather than the UEL Provisions. Foreign companies should distinguish the two lists: UEL designations impose transaction prohibitions, investment bans, visa restrictions, and fines on the designated entity itself, while Restricted Name List designations prohibit Chinese exporters from shipping dual-use items to the listed end user without a license.

Operational risk. Foreign entities on the UEL face prohibition of imports from and exports to China, prohibition of new investment in China, prohibition of senior-management entry and revocation of work permits and residence permits, and financial penalties. Chinese entities — including Chinese subsidiaries of foreign multinationals — are prohibited from transacting with UEL-designated persons. The May 2024 Caplugs warning suggests that MOFCOM may impose secondary sanctions or accessory liability on entities that facilitate transactions with UEL-designated persons or transfer Chinese-origin goods or technology to them. Companies with China operations, Chinese supply chains, or Chinese customers should screen counterparties against the UEL and maintain documentation of end-use and end-user certifications, particularly for dual-use items and technology. MOFCOM has not published a consolidated UEL in machine-readable or searchable format as of October 2025; practitioners must compile designations from individual MOFCOM announcements, spokesperson remarks, and press conferences. Trade-press sources and law-firm summaries report additional UEL designations in late 2024, early 2025, and late 2025, including designations of PVH Group, Illumina, and additional defense contractors, but these reports cannot be confirmed from MOFCOM official English-language announcements as of June 1, 2026.

Unable to confirm as of 2026-06-01.

Source: MOFCOM Regular Press Conference (May 23, 2024) — UEL designation of Boeing Defense, General Atomics, General Dynamics Source: MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Adding Three U.S. Companies to the Unreliable Entity List (October 10, 2025) — Saronic Technologies, Aerkomm, Oceaneering Source: MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Measures Concerning the Unreliable Entity List (October 16, 2025) — Dedrone, TechInsights, Elbit Systems Source: MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on the Addition of Three U.S. Entities to the Restricted Name List (October 10, 2025)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) imposes countermeasures against foreign individuals and entities under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) through ministerial decrees that take immediate effect. Each decree freezes assets in China, prohibits transactions with Chinese persons, and denies entry visas. Unlike the Ministry of Commerce's Unreliable Entity List (UEL), which targets entities that suspend normal transactions with Chinese companies or endanger China's national interests, the MFA countermeasures list focuses on foreign persons who formulate, decide on, or implement discriminatory restrictive measures against Chinese citizens or organizations or who participate in activities deemed to interfere in China's internal affairs — particularly arms sales to Taiwan. As of June 2026, the MFA has issued at least 19 numbered decrees designating over 100 individuals and entities under the AFSL since the law entered into force in June 2021. The countermeasures regime is administered by the MFA pursuant to Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 15 of the AFSL and the March 2025 Regulations on Implementation of the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law.

Statutory basis and countermeasures imposed. Under Article 3 of the AFSL, China may take countermeasures where a foreign country "violates international law and basic norms governing international relations, uses various pretexts or its own laws to contain and suppress China, adopts discriminatory or restrictive measures against Chinese citizens and organizations, and interferes in China's internal affairs." Article 5 enumerates the countermeasures: (1) denial of visa or deportation; (2) seizure, detention, or freezing of movable property, immovable property, and other assets within China; (3) prohibition or restriction on organizations and individuals within China from engaging in transactions, cooperation, or other activities with the designated person; and (4) other necessary measures. The March 2025 implementation regulations clarify that "other assets" includes cash, negotiable instruments, bank deposits, securities, fund shares, equity, intellectual property, accounts receivable, and other property and property rights. Article 6 of the AFSL permits the MFA or other relevant State Council departments to designate not only the primary person but also the spouse and immediate family members of designated individuals, senior management personnel of designated organizations, and organizations controlled or actually managed by designated persons.

Pattern of designations: focus on arms sales to Taiwan. The overwhelming majority of MFA countermeasures decrees since 2024 respond to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. On April 11, 2024, the MFA issued Decree No. 5, freezing assets and prohibiting transactions with General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems (two companies involved in repeated arms sales to Taiwan) and denying their senior personnel entry into China. On June 21, 2024, Decree No. 8 sanctioned three Lockheed Martin entities — Lockheed Martin Missile System Integration Lab, Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Laboratories, and Lockheed Martin Ventures — plus three senior executives: James Donald Taiclet (Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer), Frank Andrew St. John (Chief Operating Officer), and Jesus Malave (Chief Financial Officer). The decree froze all movable and immovable property and other assets of the three entities and three individuals within China, prohibited all organizations and individuals in China from engaging in transactions, cooperation, or other activities with them, and denied the three executives visas or entry into China (including Hong Kong and Macao).

On September 18, 2024, Decree No. 12 sanctioned nine U.S. military contractors following another U.S. arms sale to Taiwan: Sierra Nevada Corporation, Stick Rudder Enterprises LLC, Cubic Corporation, S3 AeroDefense, TCOM, Limited Partnership, TextOre, Planate Management Group, ACT1 Federal, and Exovera. The decree froze assets, prohibited transactions, and denied entry to senior personnel of these firms. On December 27, 2024, Decree No. 16 responded to U.S. military assistance and the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025 by sanctioning seven companies: Insitu, Inc., Hudson Technologies Co., Saronic Technologies, Inc., Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia, and Aerkomm Inc. (the seventh entity was not fully named in the available excerpt).

On December 26, 2025, Decree No. 19 designated 20 U.S. military-related companies and 10 senior executives following large-scale arms sales to Taiwan. The 20 companies include Northrop Grumman Systems Corporation, L3Harris Maritime Services, Boeing in St. [Louis] (partial name available), and others. The 10 executives include Palmer Luckey (founder of Anduril Industries), John Cantillon (Vice President of L3Harris Technologies and L3Harris Maritime Services), Michael J. Carnovale (President and CEO of Advanced Acoustic Concepts), John A. Cuomo (President and CEO of VSE Corporation), Mitch McDonald (President of Teal Drones, Inc.), Anshuman Roy (founder and CEO of Rhombus Power Inc.), Dan Smoot (President and CEO of Vantor), Aaditya Devarakonda (CEO of Dedrone Holdings Inc.), and Ann Wood (President of High Point Aerotechnologies). Each decree specifies that movable and immovable properties and other assets within China shall be frozen, all organizations and individuals within China shall be prohibited from engaging in transactions, cooperation, or other activities with the designated persons, and the individuals shall be denied visas or entry into China.

Designation procedures and publication. The MFA issues countermeasures through numbered ministerial decrees. Each decree states the statutory basis (Articles 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, and 15 of the AFSL), the grounds for the countermeasure (typically "seriously violates the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. Joint Communiqués, interferes in China's internal affairs, and undermines China's sovereignty and territorial integrity"), and the effective date (the date of issuance; countermeasures take effect immediately). The decrees are published on the MFA website in Chinese and English. There is no advance notice, no pre-designation investigation process disclosed to the designated person, and no hearing or administrative appeal procedure before designation. The March 2025 implementation regulations introduce a petition mechanism under which a designated person may apply to the relevant State Council department (the MFA for countermeasures under the AFSL) to suspend, modify, or cancel the countermeasure. The regulations do not specify the criteria for granting such relief. As of July 2025, only one entity — Viasat — has been removed from the countermeasures list; Viasat was designated on January 7, 2024 and removed on July 22, 2024 "due to the change in the circumstances on which the sanction is based," according to trade-press reports citing MFA announcements.

No consolidated public list. The MFA does not publish a consolidated, machine-readable countermeasures list comparable to the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. Practitioners must compile designations from individual MFA decrees, spokesperson remarks, and press releases. The MFA website includes a dedicated page for countermeasures announcements under the category "Decision on Taking Countermeasures," but the page is not a filterable database. Trade-press sources report that, as of July 2025, the MFA had carried out 11 countermeasure enforcement actions comprising 56 individuals and 57 entities, but a complete verified list is not publicly available in a single primary-source document. Some decrees list only partial entity names or refer to entities "as listed in the attached List of Targets of Countermeasures" without reproducing the full list in the published text.

Extraterritorial scope and secondary liability. Article 6 of the AFSL authorizes the MFA to designate not only the person who directly participated in the discriminatory foreign measure but also the spouse and immediate family members of a designated individual, senior management of a designated organization, and organizations controlled or actually managed by designated persons. This permits secondary sanctions-style liability. The 2025 implementation regulations further clarify that asset freezes apply to "cash, negotiable instruments, bank deposits, securities, fund shares, equity, intellectual property, accounts receivable, and other property and property rights," significantly expanding the range of frozen assets beyond physical real estate and bank accounts. Chinese subsidiaries of foreign multinationals are subject to the prohibition on transactions with designated persons even if the parent company is not itself designated. Violations by Chinese persons (failure to freeze assets or engaging in transactions with a designated person) may result in administrative penalties (warning, rectification order, fines, prohibition or restriction of related activities) or, in serious cases, criminal liability.

Operational risk. Foreign companies with operations in China, Chinese supply chains, or Chinese customers must screen counterparties against MFA countermeasures designations. The absence of a consolidated, machine-readable list increases compliance burden. Companies in the defense sector, aerospace, or other industries with Taiwan-related activities face the highest designation risk. The MFA has extended countermeasures to subsidiaries (Raytheon Canada, Raytheon Australia), individual executives (CEOs, CFOs, COOs, founders, presidents), and supporting entities (laboratories, venture-capital arms), demonstrating broad application. Once designated, a person's assets in China are frozen immediately, Chinese persons are prohibited from transacting with the designated person, and the individual is banned from entering China (including Hong Kong and Macao). The prohibition on transactions extends to Chinese subsidiaries of the designated entity's customers, suppliers, and business partners, creating supply-chain disruption risk. The petition mechanism introduced in the March 2025 regulations provides a theoretical off-ramp, but no public guidance clarifies the criteria for suspension or cancellation of countermeasures, and only one entity (Viasat) has been delisted as of mid-2025.

Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against General Atomics Aeronautical Systems and General Dynamics Land Systems (MFA Decree No. 5, April 11, 2024) Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against Entities and Senior Executives of Lockheed Martin Corporation (MFA Decree No. 8, June 21, 2024) Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against U.S. Military Companies (MFA Decree No. 12, September 18, 2024) Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against U.S. Military Companies and Senior Executives (MFA Decree No. 16, December 27, 2024) Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against U.S. Military-Related Companies and Senior Executives (MFA Decree No. 19, December 26, 2025)

Foreign individuals and entities designated under China’s Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) or added to the Ministry of Commerce’s Unreliable Entity List (UEL) face far-reaching restrictions, including transaction prohibitions, asset freezes, and visa bans. Since March 24, 2025, the AFSL’s implementation regulation and, since September 19, 2020, the UEL Provisions provide the only official road-map for petitioning removal, suspension, or modification of these measures. Practitioners should anchor any petition strictly in the plain requirements of these authorities.

AFSL Countermeasures (Ministry of Foreign Affairs designation; March 2025 regulation):

• The Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (Articles 17–18) enables a designated person to submit a written application to the relevant State Council department (typically the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for AFSL countermeasures) for suspension, modification, or cancellation of a countermeasure. The application must set out the justification and submit supporting evidence. The regulation does not impose a specific review timeline, does not enumerate required content beyond “reasons and relevant materials,” and does not define the standards for relief. There is no provision for a hearing or appeal process. Decisions are at the discretion of the department, and as of June 2026, no official guidance or list of outcomes is available beyond individual public announcements.

Unreliable Entity List (UEL; MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020, effective September 19, 2020):

• Articles 13–15 permit a designated entity or individual to apply to MOFCOM for removal (“delisting”), suspension, or modification of measures if the circumstances underlying the listing “no longer exist” or in “other necessary circumstances.” The application must be in writing and specify the facts, reasons, and any supporting materials as required by MOFCOM. MOFCOM must review the matter in a “timely” fashion and notify the applicant of its decision, but no precise timing, content format, or decision criteria are published. No requirement for a hearing or formal appeal appears in the published UEL provisions. There is no consolidated, up-to-date UEL or removal register published by MOFCOM as of June 2026; public record of successful delistings is minimal.

Operational notes: Guidance for best practice is sparse—applications should be specific, fact-driven, and provide documentary evidence of a change in circumstances or compliance posture. In both regimes, the lack of published procedures, defined standards, or appeal channels means that administrative discretion is broad and transparency is low. Practitioners must rely on direct written engagement with MFA or MOFCOM, and outcomes remain difficult to predict.

Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, effective March 24, 2025) Source: Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020, September 19, 2020)

China's Export Control Law (ECL), effective December 1, 2020, establishes the authority to maintain a "Restricted Name List" (受限名录) and impose end-user and end-use prohibitions to safeguard non-proliferation, national security, and ensure compliance with export control obligations. Article 23 authorizes the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) and other designated agencies to prohibit or restrict exports of controlled items—including dual-use goods and technologies—to listed importers, end users, or for end uses presenting a risk of proliferation, national security threats, or inadequate compliance cooperation. Entry onto the Restricted Name List may result from involvement in violation of export controls, obstructing post-shipment supervision, or presenting risks to national security or international obligations.

2026 developments—materially expanded enforcement and transparency

Recent MOFCOM actions have materially expanded both the use and public specificity of the Restricted Name List framework:

• MOFCOM Announcement No. 12 (February 24, 2026)—Japanese entities and Watch List: MOFCOM officially designated 20 Japanese companies and research institutions on the Restricted Name List for actions deemed to threaten China's security or violate export control compliance. The same announcement introduced a new "Watch List," applying enhanced scrutiny and licensing restrictions short of a full prohibition—an expansion provided for under Articles 23–24 of the ECL. The measures also clarify that entities facilitating re-export or transshipment of Chinese-origin controlled items in violation of restrictions may themselves be listed or penalized, expanding extraterritorial reach. Exporters must screen for Watch List and Restricted Name List entities, and exports to these parties generally require specific licensing, are presumptively denied, or are outright prohibited depending on the listing.

• June 22, 2026—Bans on U.S. entities: MOFCOM and affiliated agencies imposed immediate and full bans on exports of dual-use items (notably rare earths, technology, and equipment) to 10 named U.S. companies, by explicit invocation of both the Export Control Law and the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. These new restrictions are presented as direct countermeasures to foreign export control actions against China and are implemented via public MOFCOM announcements, demonstrating MOFCOM’s operationalization of the Restricted Name List for high-profile, geopolitically salient targets. Entities subject to this prohibition cannot access Chinese-controlled dual-use items or technologies, with rare exceptions subject to case-by-case licensing unlikely to be granted.

Procedural notes:

• MOFCOM now regularly publishes designations and updates via announcements, but no central or searchable database of Restricted Name List or Watch List entries exists as of June 2026. Practitioners must review MOFCOM's English- and Chinese-language announcement pages for current restrictions.
• Article 24 continues to provide a mechanism for applications for removal or modification of restrictions, but no procedural detail or review standard is published, and success rates are not reported.

The ECL's Restricted Name List is distinct from the Unreliable Entity List (UEL), with the former focused on end-user/end-use restrictions for controlled exports and the latter imposing commercial and investment bans for broader conduct. Both frameworks are being used with increasing frequency and transparency in response to the evolving global sanctions environment.

Sources: Source: Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020), Article 23 Source: MOFCOM Announcement No. 12 of 2026—Japanese entities and Watch List (Chinese) Source: MOFCOM Announcement—June 22, 2026 bans on U.S. entities (Chinese)

The General Administration of Customs (GACC) is China's principal authority for enforcing export controls and sanctions at the border, acting pursuant to the Export Control Law (ECL), the Customs Law, and a suite of operational GACC announcements. GACC responsibilities include inspecting outbound goods, verifying documentation, detaining suspicious shipments, and imposing penalties for export control violations involving controlled items, dual-use technologies, or exports to listed parties.

Customs inspection and verification (statute and enforcement announcements as of June 2026). Under Article 32 of the ECL, GACC is empowered to inspect export goods, examine export documents, and verify the declared end user, end use, and licensing status of controlled items. GACC Announcement No. 57 of 2026 has expanded spot-check inspections to cover key electronic-grade chemicals, with effect from June 1, 2026. Further, GACC now targets categories such as expansion joints and shock absorbers (June 2026) for close inspection due to perceived diversion and proliferation risk, in addition to existing priority goods including CNC machine tools and drones.

Export declaration requirements—new rules in 2026. Effective May 8, 2026, dual-use and sensitive goods must be declared with a Restriction Identification Code (RIC) on export documents, as mandated in recent customs bulletins. For certain controlled products, including CNC machine tools and drones, GACC Announcement No. 77 and No. 78 of 2026 require the explicit coding of export control category or technical characteristics in customs declarations from June 30, 2026. Exporters must provide technical disclosures, and failure to enter the required control code can result in shipment detention. These requirements supplement ECL Article 36’s general obligation: exporters and related parties must cooperate with GACC checks and comply with documentation and inquiry requests.

Penalties for violations. Administrative penalties for export control breaches are anchored in ECL Article 45 and Customs Law Articles 86–88. If GACC identifies unauthorized exports, false documentation, or unlicensed export of controlled goods, it may confiscate illegal proceeds, impose fines ranging from the illegal turnover amount up to five times that amount, and, in severe circumstances, recommend criminal prosecution. The ECL authorizes suspension/revocation of licenses for serious/repeat violators (ECL Article 46; Customs Law Article 88).

Operational limitations. Statutes and GACC announcements spell out new enforcement powers and documentation requirements, but do not detail the internal procedures for GACC’s list screening or mandate public real-time restricted-party databases. The frequency of detentions and specifics of algorithmic risk-screening remain undisclosed as of June 2026.

Material update for June 2026: Expanded spot-check programs and new declaration content rules (RIC/code) now apply to a broader range of dual-use goods and strategic exports at PRC borders. Previous guide versions did not reflect these enforcement expansions.

Source: Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 32, 36, 38, 45, 46, 47 (effective December 1, 2020) Source: Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended 2021), Articles 86–88

China’s sanctions and export control regime grants regulatory authorities significant discretion to issue licences, exemptions, or authorizations that permit otherwise prohibited transactions or activities—including exports of controlled items or dealings with designated entities subject to countermeasures. This licensing and exemption architecture spans the Export Control Law (ECL), Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) and its implementation regulation, as well as the Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (UEL Provisions). Practitioners must pay close attention both to the formal application processes and to the limits—many procedural details are either unpublished or remain at the agency’s discretion.

Export Control Law (ECL) and dual-use export licensing:

• Article 15 of the ECL specifies that exporters of controlled items—dual-use goods, military supplies, nuclear materials—must obtain export licences from the relevant authorities, most commonly the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM). Exporters submit detailed applications specifying the item, end user, end use, and importer. Licensing is required for items on the control list, as well as for items not specifically listed (“catch-all” control, Article 12) destined for proliferation or national-security-sensitive end uses or users. Article 27 requires end-user and end-use certificates as part of the licence application.
• Article 15 also recognizes that “in case of emergency or special circumstances, temporary export control measures or exceptions may be adopted,” though specific standards and timelines are not detailed in the statutory text. MOFCOM retains broad discretion to approve, deny, or condition licences, and may revoke them upon evidence of a compliance breach (Article 30).

AFSL and UEL exemptions/authorizations:

• Under the March 2025 Regulation on Implementing the AFSL, Article 18, a designated person/entity may apply to the relevant State Council department for suspension, modification, or cancellation of a countermeasure—a form of exemption. The application must identify the grounds and provide supporting materials. The regulation does not spell out timelines, required documentation details, or the criteria for grant/denial of relief; decisions remain discretionary, with no appeal process.
• UEL Provisions, Article 14, permit listed entities to petition MOFCOM for removal, suspension, or modification of UEL measures "in necessary circumstances"—which can include transaction-specific exceptions. The applicant must supply a written request and supporting evidence. The Provisions mandate that MOFCOM review requests “in a timely” manner, but provide no deadline or required format; the decision is solely at MOFCOM’s discretion.

Operational notes and pitfalls:

• No Chinese agency maintains a consolidated or public register of granted, denied, or revoked licences/exemptions; nor do published announcements include statistics or eligibility criteria beyond the broad statutory framing. This is a marked contrast with the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC licence search and the EU’s authorisation database.
• Practitioners should ensure applications are fact-rich and document compliance posture, but must accept that outcomes are unpredictable and that there is no formal appeal after denial under PRC practice as of June 2026.

Source: Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020) Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, effective March 24, 2025) Source: Provisions on the Unreliable Entity List (MOFCOM Order No. 4 of 2020, September 19, 2020)

China's Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) and Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation (the "blocking statute") are, on the surface, aimed at deterring and countering restrictive measures imposed by the U.S. and Europe. However, non-U.S., non-EU businesses—those incorporated or headquartered in neutral third countries—face real operational exposure when transacting with both Chinese and sanctioned U.S./EU parties. Understanding the extraterritorial application of China’s regime and the secondary-sanctions compliance trap is now central for any multinational navigating cross-border supply chains involving China.

Scope of extraterritorial reach. While China’s AFSL and blocking rules are explicitly focused on “foreign countries that abuse restrictions against China,” the text does not limit countermeasures to U.S. or EU legal entities. Article 6 of the AFSL authorizes countermeasures not only against primary actors formulating or implementing discriminatory measures, but also against "relevant organizations and individuals" involved in their execution. The March 2025 AFSL implementation regulation (Art. 7) authorizes extension of measures to “organizations and individuals controlled or actually managed by persons subject to countermeasures.” For the blocking statute, any party—regardless of nationality—found to comply with a forbidden foreign measure could be exposed to civil liability and administrative penalties under Articles 9 and 13 if their actions damage Chinese interests or entities.

Third-country company scenarios. The most common operational dilemmas arise for businesses with commercial presence in China but headquartered in Singapore, Japan, Brazil, or the UAE that:

• Have U.S. or EU subsidiaries subject to sanctions or export controls on Chinese counterparties;
• Are pressured by U.S. or EU banks, insurers, or supply-chain partners to cease trade with Chinese Sanctions Law targets;
• Require compliance with conflicting measures (U.S./EU secondary sanctions vs. China’s blocking statute or AFSL countermeasures);
• Face lawsuits from Chinese partners under Article 9 of the blocking statute for complying with “unjustified” foreign sanctions, even if mandated elsewhere.

Public enforcement action or reported court cases involving pure third-country companies remain unconfirmed as of June 2026; MOFCOM’s published guidance and press conferences reiterate the discretion and case-by-case application of relief, but stop short of detailing precedent or quantitative risk.

Practical risk: case-by-case, not automatic. To date, no MOFCOM announcement or MFA decree plainly identifies a third-country company as a principal or collateral target of countermeasures or blocking-liability (outside multinational subsidiaries of U.S./EU firms, which count as “Chinese persons” when incorporated domestically). The Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extraterritorial Application of Foreign Legislation (Art. 2, Art. 7) and the AFSL regime (Art. 6) both provide theoretical authority for far-reaching application, but in practice enforcement has focused on U.S./EU actors and Chinese subsidiaries of multinational groups—leaving risk for non-U.S./EU headquartered companies context-specific, fact-driven, and heavily discretionary. Practitioners should monitor MOFCOM releases closely and document internal country-of-incorporation and compliance structure to support risk assessment if designated.

Unable to confirm as of 2026-06-16.

Source: Law of the People’s Republic of China on Countering Foreign Sanctions (AFSL, June 10, 2021) Source: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021) Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, March 24, 2025)

Exporters of controlled items from China must obtain an export licence from the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) or its delegated agencies before proceeding. The governing legal instruments are the Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China (ECL, effective December 1, 2020) and the Measures for the Administration of Export Licenses for Dual-Use Items and Technologies (MOFCOM Order No. 29 of 2005, as amended).

Licensing step-by-step — statutory workflow:

1. Determine if an export licence is required: Under ECL Articles 14–15 and Measures Article 3, exporters must determine if the item is covered by China’s export control lists, subject to catch-all controls (ECL Art. 12), or under temporary controls. Dual-use, military, and nuclear items, as well as controlled technologies, are all in scope.

1. Prepare the application: Application requirements are established by ECL Art. 16 and Measures Article 8. Submissions must include: a description of the item, destination country/region, end user and intended end use, a copy of the sales contract or agreement, business registration documents, the end-user/end-use certificate required under ECL Art. 27, and other documents if specified by MOFCOM. The Measures set the content requirements for dual-use items; military/nuclear licences may have different add-ons under sector-specific rules.

1. Submission and review: The exporter files the application with MOFCOM or a delegated local commerce authority. MOFCOM examines applications for completeness and whether the item, end user, and end use are in line with non-proliferation and national security requirements (ECL Arts. 16 and 17; Measures Art. 10). Where necessary, MOFCOM may consult with other relevant departments. The ECL and Measures do not specify a deadline or review period.

1. Issuance or denial: If approved, MOFCOM issues an export licence stating the item, recipient, quantity, value, and validity period (Measures Art. 15). If denied, the applicant is notified in writing (ECL Art. 16), but neither the ECL nor Measures require MOFCOM to specify reasons or provide for an internal appeal. The statute is silent on further recourse.

1. Customs clearance: Exporters must present the export licence to China Customs (GACC) at the time of export (ECL Art. 32; Customs Law Art. 43). Customs will inspect the shipment, validate paperwork, and clear goods if compliant.

1. After export: The exporter is obliged to retain records for at least five years (ECL Art. 42). Any change in end use or end user, or re-export from the consignee, generally requires new MOFCOM authorization (ECL Art. 33).

The ECL and Measures are silent on review timelines, appeal or reconsideration rights, and procedural guidance beyond the formal requirements above. Agencies may prescribe additional documentation or practical steps in public notices, but the base procedure is as above.

Source: Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020) Source: Measures for the Administration of Export Licenses for Dual-Use Items and Technologies (MOFCOM Order No. 29 of 2005, as amended) (Chinese)

China does not publish a consolidated, machine-readable sanctions or designated-entity list akin to the U.S. Treasury’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List or the EU’s consolidated sanction lists. Instead, sanction designations—whether by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) under the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) or by the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) under the Unreliable Entity List (UEL) or Restricted Name List frameworks—are posted individually as ministerial decrees, press releases, or spokesperson remarks. There is no official downloadable database, API, or consolidated spreadsheet of all designated parties as of 2026-06-16.

MFA (AFSL) Countermeasures: Announcements of countermeasures against foreign individuals and entities are posted as stand-alone decisions on the MFA press releases portal, each containing narrative listings of affected persons, entities, or asset types (see, for example, Decree No. 19, December 26, 2025). There is no official aggregator, search interface, or bulk download function for all designations. Practitioners must manually review the sequence of MFA announcements to compile an operative list.

MOFCOM Unreliable Entity List (UEL): Designations to the UEL appear as individual press releases or spokesperson remarks on the MOFCOM website. MOFCOM has not published an aggregated, machine-readable UEL; instead, entities must piece together a current list by consulting the chronological series of public statements. For example, the UEL designation of several U.S. defense contractors on October 10 and October 16, 2025 is only accessible as narrative text in those individual bulletins. No official database, CSV, or embedded list is available for bulk compliance screening.

Restricted Name List: End-user and end-use restrictions under the Export Control Law are likewise published as discrete MOFCOM notices with affected parties named in-article. There is no public, comprehensive Restricted Name List database, and compliance personnel must parse announcements for current restrictions.

Screening implications: As of June 2026, there is no single authoritative download or screening tool provided by Chinese authorities for sanctioned or controlled-party screening. Agencies provide neither aggregated lists nor APIs for compliance functions, and there is no statutory requirement or published regulatory guidance mandating an official consolidated sanctions list. This absence increases manual compliance risk and necessitates routine monitoring of the MFA and MOFCOM portals, including cross-checking individual announcements and decrees.

Example source for MFA countermeasures publication: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against U.S. Military-Related Companies and Senior Executives (MFA Decree No. 19, December 26, 2025)

Example source for MOFCOM UEL designations: MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Measures Concerning the Unreliable Entity List (October 16, 2025)

Source: Decision on Taking Countermeasures Against U.S. Military-Related Companies and Senior Executives (MFA Decree No. 19, December 26, 2025) Source: MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Measures Concerning the Unreliable Entity List (October 16, 2025)

China’s sanctions and export control regime—principally structured around the Export Control Law (ECL), Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL), Unreliable Entity List (UEL) Provisions, MOFCOM’s blocking rules, and, as of July 1, 2026, the State Council Regulations on Outbound Investment (Order No. 837)—places compliance risk squarely on both Chinese and multinational operators. Practitioners face compounded challenges: evolving statutory diligence, expanded recordkeeping and reporting duties, national security screenings, and a notable absence of detailed regulatory compliance guidance or safe-harbor rules from Chinese authorities.

Key statutory compliance duties (grounded in primary source):

• Screening and counterparty diligence: The ECL (Arts. 23, 36) requires exporters must not ship controlled items for prohibited end-uses or end-users and must cooperate with compliance inspections. Companies must continuously monitor MOFCOM and MFA announcements for updates to designated or restricted persons and uses. As of June 2026, there is no official aggregator, database, or downloadable sanctioned-party list. Unable to confirm a machine-readable source as of 2026-06-16.
• Outbound investment national security & export control checks: Effective July 1, 2026, outbound Chinese (and certain foreign-involved) investments must comply with new lifecycle supervision rules and national security review mechanisms under State Council Order No. 837. Article 13 mandates that outbound projects adhere to PRC export controls and data transfer restrictions; Article 15 requires national security risk self-assessment and possible government vetting; Articles 23–25 empower authorities to impose countermeasures in response to discriminatory foreign actions affecting outbound investments. Multinationals partnering with, receiving investment from, or exporting controlled technology to Chinese enterprises must ensure diligence processes capture these new legal requirements.
• Documentation and record retention: ECL Art. 42 requires exporters to retain transaction records (contracts, end-use/user certifications, licences, and correspondence) for at least five years. This is an express statutory mandate, without detailed format or filing system requirements. State Council Order No. 837 reinforces documentation and reporting mandates across the lifecycle of outbound projects.
• Reporting obligations: MOFCOM’s blocking rules (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021, Art. 5) require Chinese persons to report to MOFCOM within 30 days if they are restricted by foreign (e.g., U.S. or EU) measures from normal economic activity with third countries. ECL Art. 36 separately requires cooperation with compliance inquiries from authorities.

Best-practice inferences and operational risk (explicitly drawn from absence, not rule):

• Internal escalation and monitoring: Chinese law remains silent on workflow, but companies are well-advised to implement escalation protocols for hits on newly designated parties, foreign sanctions conflicts, or national security screening triggers (especially under Order No. 837).
• Staff training: No PRC law yet mandates regular compliance training, but, given the rising complexity, practitioners should document internal awareness and control measures.
• Scope of screening: Neither the ECL, AFSL, nor Order No. 837 specifies how far diligence should extend for subsidiaries or affiliates; practitioners commonly screen broadly to cover entities and individuals "controlled or managed" by a sanctioned or restricted party.

Operational reality: There is still no model compliance program, safe-harbor rule, or formal best-practice definition in Chinese law as of June 2026. Compliance must be engineered around the plain text duties in statute and regular monitoring of MFA, MOFCOM, and now State Council announcements. When uncertain, practitioners should focus on recordkeeping, cooperation, and document defensive decision-making in anticipation of possible review or scrutiny by GACC, MOFCOM, or sectoral regulators.

Source: Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020), Arts. 23, 36, 42 Source: Rules on Counteracting Unjustified Extra-territorial Application of Foreign Legislation (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021) Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, effective March 24, 2025) Source: Regulations of the State Council on Outbound Investment (Order No. 837, effective July 1, 2026)

China’s sanctions and export-control authorities wield a toolkit of penalties for violations, codified in the Export Control Law (ECL, effective December 1, 2020), the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL), and associated regulations. Understanding how penalties are calculated and applied is central for practitioners facing enforcement risk.

Export Control Law (ECL) — administrative penalties:

• Article 45 is the principal penalty provision in the ECL. For unlicensed export of controlled items, providing false end-user documentation, or exporting to restricted end users without authorisation, the violator faces both confiscation of illegal income and fines. The fine amount ranges from the value of the illegal turnover to five times that amount. If the illegal turnover is difficult to calculate, the fine is set at up to ¥5 million for companies, or up to ¥500,000 for individuals.
• When circumstances are “especially serious,” Article 46 authorises the authorities to suspend or revoke the company’s export licence and customs registration. Serious or repeated violations can be referred for criminal prosecution under Article 47.
• Related provisions in the Customs Law (Articles 86–88) authorise confiscation of goods, imposition of fines, and denial of customs clearance.

Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (AFSL) — countermeasures and penalties:

• The AFSL and its March 2025 implementing regulation enumerate asset freezes, transaction bans, and prohibition on entry or visa issuance as the core countermeasures. While Article 15 and the implementing rules provide for administrative warnings, rectification orders, and fines, the statute and regulation do not specify maximum fine levels or a formula for assessment. The actual determination of fines and their amounts is at agency discretion. If a party fails to comply with countermeasures or does not assist enforcement, further administrative penalties or referral for criminal investigation are possible. Statutory text is silent on the existence of an appeal or hearing process and does not specify procedural timelines.

Blocking Rules (MOFCOM Order No. 1 of 2021):

• Article 13 authorises MOFCOM to issue warnings, rectification orders, and fines against Chinese persons failing to report or to comply with a prohibition order. The amount of fines and calculation method are not defined in the primary text. The Rules do not describe procedures for appeals or hearings, nor do they establish benchmarking for fine amounts. No official announcement or public register details imposed fines or resolved cases as of June 2026.

Timeline and procedure:

• Statutes specify that after a potential violation is discovered, the administrative authority (MOFCOM, GACC, or the relevant State Council department) may initiate an investigation, notify the target, and request information, but they do not provide detailed timelines, hearing rights, or explicit appeal channels. In practice, fines, license suspensions, and confiscations are imposed by administrative order. Parties theoretically have access to Chinese courts for judicial review, but no published statute mandates a specific procedure for challenging these penalties, and public records of appeals or decisions are sparse.

Operational reality:

• Fine amounts, methods of asset seizure, and criteria for criminal referral remain at the authorities’ discretion, and statutory guidance is limited to the penalty ranges and triggers above. Statutory silence on appeals, deadlines, and implementation details means enforcement practice is context-dependent and not fully described in published law. Practitioners should preserve thorough compliance records and respond promptly and cooperatively if under investigation.

Source: Export Control Law of the People’s Republic of China, Articles 45–47 Source: Customs Law of the People’s Republic of China (amended 2021), Articles 86–88 Source: Regulation on Implementing the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law (State Council, effective March 24, 2025)

China’s sanctions and export control regime imposes liability not only on direct violators but also on third parties who facilitate or enable breaches of export restrictions. This risk is most relevant to supply chain intermediaries, service providers (such as freight forwarders, customs brokers, and banks), and any entity involved in arranging, financing, or disguising controlled exports.

Statutory basis for accessory liability:

• Under the Export Control Law (ECL, effective December 1, 2020), Article 48 provides that any person who “provides agency, freight, delivery, customs clearance, third-party e-commerce, financing, or intermediary services” that facilitate an export-control violation bears legal responsibility under Chinese law.
• Article 38 of the ECL empowers customs authorities to detain, seize, or order the return of goods where export controls are violated “by concealing, misrepresenting, transshipping, or otherwise evading supervision,” directly addressing indirect or disguised export attempts involving intermediaries.

Penalties for facilitation:

• Article 45 of the ECL states that for violations—including those facilitated as described above—the exporter or service provider may face confiscation of illegal proceeds and fines ranging from the value of the illegal turnover to five times that amount. In serious cases, administrative authorities may suspend or revoke export licences or refer cases for criminal investigation.
• Articles 86–88 of the Customs Law further empower customs to confiscate goods involved in violations, impose fines, and recommend criminal prosecution for serious or repeat offenses.

Scope and practical considerations:

• The ECL’s liability net covers service providers and intermediaries even where they are not the primary exporters, if their actions directly enable an export-control violation. “Agency” and “intermediary services” include a wide variety of transactional roles—a prudent compliance posture thus requires service providers to screen transactions and counterparties for export-control risk.
• Neither the ECL nor the Customs Law provides a specific standard on intent (e.g., "knowingly" vs. "strict liability"); the statutes are silent on whether inadvertent facilitation, willful blindness, or strict knowledge is required. No published judicial or agency guidance addresses this threshold as of 2026-06-16.

Operational risk:

• Because the enabling provisions are broadly worded and intent standards are not specified, logistics providers and other intermediaries should document their diligence in screening and handling shipments involving controlled items. In practice, the mere provision of services used in an illegal export may expose the provider to investigation and penalty.

Unable to confirm as of 2026-06-16 whether Chinese courts or MOFCOM have published clarifying guidance or case law on the distinction between innocent facilitation and actionable accessory liability.

Source: Export Control Law of the People's Republic of China (effective December 1, 2020), Arts. 38, 45, 48 Source: Customs Law of the People's Republic of China (amended 2021), Arts. 86–88